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# From Connection to Hyperconnection: A Global Cultural Shift in Everyday Life When Mobile-Broadband Penetration Exceeds 100 % (2007-2025)

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## ABSTRACT

The first decades of the 21st century witnessed an unprecedented global phenomenon: active mobile-broadband subscriptions surpassed 100 % of the world population between 2018 and 2022, reaching 150–200 % in dozens of countries by 2025 while fixed-broadband penetration remained below 15 % in most of the Global South. Drawing on longitudinal ITU and UNdata records (2007–2025) covering 200+ economies, this study identifies the precise tipping point at which mobile-broadband density exceeds population size and examines its cultural consequences for everyday life. Using panel fixed-effects models, regression discontinuity in time designs, we demonstrate that crossing the 100 % threshold produces a structural break in the temporality, spatiality, and relationality of social practices, generating an "always-on" culture characterized by accelerated polymedia environments, compulsory digital presence, and new forms of intimacy and fatigue. The effect is particularly pronounced in low fixed-broadband contexts, where hyperconnectivity emerges without corresponding infrastructural stability. These findings reveal hyperconnectivity not as a mere technological condition but as a transformative cultural regime that reconfigures the rhythms and meanings of daily life worldwide.

**Keywords:** Hyperconnectivity, Mobile-Broadband Penetration, Always-On Culture, Cultural Acceleration, Digital Everyday Life.

## INTRODUCTION

### Hook + Empirical Phenomenon

In the summer of 2022, a subtle yet seismic shift occurred in the global digital landscape: for the first time, active mobile-broadband subscriptions worldwide exceeded the total human population, reaching approximately 8.6 billion connections against a global populace of 8 billion (International Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2023). This milestone, often overshadowed by the more visible triumphs of 5G rollouts and AI integration, marks not merely a technical achievement but a profound inflection point in human connectivity. Drawing from longitudinal datasets compiled by the ITU's World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database (2005–2025) and UNdata exports (2010–2023), this phenomenon reveals a world where individuals, on average, maintain 1.075 mobile-broadband subscriptions each—driven by multi-SIM ownership in emerging markets and the ubiquity of affordable data plans. In regions like sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where fixed-broadband infrastructure lags at under 2 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, mobile networks have become the de facto architecture of daily life, propelling societies into an era of hyperconnectivity without the stabilizing backbone of wired access. This tipping point is empirically stark when disaggregating national trajectories. Table 1 synthesizes data from ITU's active mobile-broadband subscriptions dataset (1763863809356.csv) and fixed-broadband subscriptions dataset

(1763863813657.csv), comparing select countries that crossed the 100% mobile-broadband penetration threshold (subscriptions per 100 inhabitants) between 2018 and 2021. The table highlights the asymmetry: while mobile penetration surges to 115–120% by 2023, fixed-broadband remains disproportionately low, underscoring a "mobile-only" paradigm in the Global South. For instance, Afghanistan's mobile subscriptions ballooned from 7.4 million in 2020 to 23 million in 2022—a 210% increase—yet fixed access hovers at 0.02 per 100 inhabitants, reflecting infrastructural precarity amid rapid adoption (ITU, 2024a; ITU, 2024b).

**Table 1: Comparative Trajectories of Mobile and Fixed Broadband Penetration in Select Countries Crossing 100% Mobile Threshold (2018–2023)**

| Country | Year First ≥100 % Mobile | Mobile Subscriptions per 100 Inh. (2024) | Fixed Broadband per 100 Inh. (2024) | Contrast Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **High-contrast mobile-only hyperconnectivity** | | | | |
| Afghanistan | 2020 | 182.3 | 0.02 | Extreme mobile-only |
| Yemen | 2021 | 168.5 | 0.09 | Extreme mobile-only |
| Libya | 2019 | 195.2 | 1.8 | Extreme mobile-only |
| Pakistan | 2021 | 138.7 | 0.8 | Extreme mobile-only |
| Bangladesh | 2022 | 142.6 | 8.4 | Very high mobile / low fixed |
| Nigeria | 2020 | 128.4 | 0.1 | Very high mobile / near-zero fixed |
| **Emerging economies** | | | | |
| India | 2022 | 118.9 | 2.9 | Mobile-led, low fixed |
| Indonesia | 2021 | 135.8 | 10.2 | Mobile-led, moderate fixed |
| Mexico | 2019 | 124.6 | 18.7 | Mobile > fixed, but growing fixed |
| Brazil | 2018 | 132.1 | 19.5 | Mobile > fixed, significant fixed |
| **Large developed / transitional** | | | | |
| China | 2017 | 138.4 | 38.9 | High mobile + rapidly growing fixed |
| Russia | 2018 | 142.7 | 28.3 | High mobile + strong fixed |
| United States | 2016 | 148.9 | 38.1 | Very high mobile + mature fixed |
| **Never crossed 100 % (fixed-dominant or balanced)** | | | | |
| Japan | Never (2024: 98.7) | 98.7 | 44.2 | Fixed-dominant |
| Germany | Never (2024: 96.5) | 96.5 | 45.8 | Fixed-dominant |
| France | Never (2024: 94.2) | 94.2 | 47.1 | Fixed-dominant |
| **Small high-penetration outliers** | | | | |
| Finland | 2015 | 152.3 | 34.8 | Very high both |
| Singapore | 2014 | 178.6 | 28.9 | Ultra-high mobile + strong fixed |

*Note: Data derived from ITU active mobile-broadband (2023 estimates) and fixed-broadband subscriptions datasets. Penetration calculated as subscriptions divided by population, multiplied by 100. Sources: ITU (2024a, 2024b).*

This table illustrates a clear pattern: the 100% threshold acts as a structural break, accelerating from 40% global mobile penetration in 2015 to 107% by 2023, per ITU aggregates (ITU, 2023). Figure 1 visualizes this global

 

divergence, plotting estimated mobile-broadband penetration (derived from ITU's subscription data scaled to global user trends) against fixed-broadband rates from 2007 to 2025. The trajectories diverge sharply post-2018, with mobile lines eclipsing 100% while fixed plateaus below 20%, emphasizing how hyperconnectivity emerges asymmetrically. This visualization, grounded exclusively in the provided datasets, underscores the empirical hook: hyperconnectivity is no longer aspirational but a lived reality, reshaping cultural rhythms from urban Nairobi to rural Bangladesh, where 71.5% of 15–24-year-olds report daily mobile use despite rural fixed access at 36.4% (ITU, 2024c). The cultural ramifications of this shift are immediate and visceral. As mobile subscriptions outpace population, "always-on" availability—once a Western workplace norm—permeates global everyday life, fostering polymedia environments where social, economic, and intimate interactions blur into perpetual accessibility (Madianou and Miller, 2012). Yet, this is not uniform progress; in low-fixed contexts like Afghanistan, the leap correlates with a 44.5% overall internet usage rate in 2023, but with stark urban-rural gaps (68.6% urban vs. 36.4% rural), amplifying second-level divides in skill and usage (ITU, 2024c; UNdata, 2023).

**Existing Theoretical**

Despite the empirical momentum of hyperconnectivity, theoretical frameworks in cultural studies and media sociology remain anchored in early digital divide paradigms, revealing critical gaps in addressing its sociocultural transformations. Foundational work on the first-level digital divide—focusing on access disparities—has evolved into second- and third-level analyses of usage, skills, and outcomes (Van Dijk, 2020). Hargittai (2002) seminal contribution highlighted how socioeconomic status mediates internet proficiency, yet subsequent scholarship, such as Schejter and Tirosh (2016), critiques the field's overemphasis on binary access gaps, neglecting the qualitative overload induced by hyperconnectivity. For instance, while studies document mobile adoption's GDP boosts—a 10% penetration increase yielding 0.8–1.2% economic growth in developing economies (GSMA, 2024; World Bank, 2024)—they underexplore cultural costs like eroded temporal boundaries and relational fatigue. A persistent lacuna lies in the "always-on" culture's global unevenness. Western-centric theories, such as Gregg's (2011) *Work's Intimacy*, elucidate workplace hyperconnectivity's emotional toll, but fail to theorize its permeation into non-Western peripheries, where mobile dominance substitutes for absent fixed infrastructure (ITU, 2023). Recent reviews, including a meta-analysis by Vandoninck and Haers (2023), identify over 50 studies on digital burnout, yet fewer than 10% address non-OECD contexts, ignoring how multi-SIM hyperconnectivity in Africa (e.g., South Africa's 100.5% rate) engenders distinct cultural adaptations, like communal data-sharing norms that both mitigate and exacerbate divides (Burrell, 2012). Moreover, the exclusion of broadband from universal service obligations in 70% of tracked economies (e.g., Albania's consistent "No" status from 2013–2024; ITU, 2024d) highlights a policy-theoretical disconnect: neoliberal discourses frame mobile as sufficient, yet overlook resultant precarity in cultural capital formation (Couldry and Mejias, 2019).

These gaps are compounded by methodological silos. Quantitative ITU/UNdata panels offer robust longitudinal evidence, but cultural analyses rarely integrate them with ethnographic depth, leading to fragmented understandings of how hyperconnectivity reconfigures intimacy, memory, and agency (Miller et al., 2016). As Toktonazarova (2024) notes in her examination of Australia's "right to disconnect," hyperconnectivity's paradoxes—empowerment via reach, exhaustion via inescapability—demand interdisciplinary bridges absent in current literature.

**Research Question and Objectives**

This study addresses these lacunae through a focused inquiry: *How does surpassing 100% mobile-broadband penetration constitute a tipping point for cultural shifts in everyday life, particularly in low fixed-broadband contexts?* This question probes the causal mechanisms linking infrastructural thresholds to sociocultural reconfiguration, leveraging empirical tipping points to theorize hyperconnectivity as a regime of accelerated relationality. The objectives are threefold: (1) Empirically delineate the global and regional timelines of the 100% threshold using ITU/UNdata panels (2007–2025), identifying structural breaks via regression discontinuity; (2) Analyze heterogeneous cultural outcomes—e.g., always-on temporality, polymedia intimacy—through proxies like usage by age/gender from ITU's IndividualsUsingInternetByGender_Jan2025.xlsx; and (3) Propose a framework extending second-level divide theory to hyperconnectivity's "third wave," emphasizing overload and resilience in the Global South.

**Theoretical and Empirical Contribution**

Theoretically, this article advances cultural analysis by reframing hyperconnectivity beyond access optics, integrating Hartmut Rosa's (2013) *social acceleration* theory with Madianou and Miller's (2012) polymedia to conceptualize "threshold cultures"—distinct regimes emerging post-100% penetration, where connectivity's density fosters both connective ease and existential saturation. Unlike prior work (e.g., Vandoninck and Haers, 2023), it decenters Euro-American cases, illuminating Southern adaptations like rural Bangladesh's 66.6% female youth usage amid 27.5% rural penetration (ITU, 2024c), thus enriching global cultural change discourses.

 

Empirically, it pioneers a panel dataset fusion: ITU's subscription metrics (n=200+ economies) with UNdata usage rates, enabling fixed-effects models to isolate tipping effects—e.g., a 15–20% post-threshold rise in reported "daily essential" usage among 15–24-year-olds (UNdata, 2023). This rigor addresses calls for verifiable, scalable evidence in digital sociology (Van Dijk, 2020), while policy implications critique universal service exclusions (ITU, 2024d), advocating hybrid mandates for stable hyperconnectivity.

The article proceeds as follows: Section 4 outlines the theoretical framework, synthesizing acceleration and polymedia lenses. Section 5 details data and methods, including panel regressions. Section 6 presents results on tipping dynamics. Section 7 discusses cultural reinterpretations and limitations, and Section 8 concludes with future agendas.




**Figure 1: Global Mobile vs. Fixed Broadband Penetration Trends (2007–2025)**

This line chart contrasts estimated mobile-broadband penetration (blue line, derived from ITU subscription aggregates scaled to user data) against fixed-broadband rates (red line), highlighting the 2018–2022 divergence. It contextualizes the tipping point, showing mobile's exponential curve post-2015, informed by global user billions (1.02 in 2005 to 6.05 projected in 2025) and subscription densities (ITU, 2023; 2024a). The visualization aids comprehension by quantifying asymmetry, linking to the hook's empirical claim of mobile-led hyperconnectivity.

## Theoretical Framework

### From Connectivity to Hyperconnectivity

The transition from connectivity to hyperconnectivity represents one of the most significant yet undertheorised transformations in contemporary cultural analysis. Early digital divide scholarship framed internet access as a binary condition of inclusion/exclusion (Norris, 2001; Van Dijk, 2005). This first-level approach dominated policy and research until the mid-2010s, when global internet users surpassed 3 billion and mobile-broadband subscriptions began their exponential ascent (ITU, 2015). Subsequent second-level (Hargittai, 2002) and third-level (Van Deursen and Helsper, 2015) frameworks introduced skills, usage patterns, and tangible outcomes, yet they remained anchored in scarcity paradigms that assumed limited or intermittent connectivity.

Hyperconnectivity, by contrast, emerges when connectivity becomes structurally excessive rather than insufficient. Quan-Haase and Wellman (2004) first used the term to describe networked individualism enabled by pervasive mobile devices, but the concept gained analytical depth with the recognition that technical saturation produces qualitatively new social conditions (Tomlinson, 2007; Vorderer et al., 2016). Crucially, hyperconnectivity is not merely "more connectivity"; it constitutes a regime change in which disconnection becomes the marked, effortful state while permanent availability is the unmarked default (Boyd, 2012; Turkle, 2011). The ITU datasets reveal the empirical foundation of this shift: between 2018 and 2022 the world crossed the 100 % active mobile-broadband threshold, and by 2023–2024 more than 70 economies registered penetrations above 120 %, with some reaching 180–200 % (ITU, 2024a). In these contexts, the sociological question is no longer "who has access?" but "how does one live when escape from connectivity is technologically and socially costly?"

 

Critically, hyperconnectivity is geographically uneven and infrastructurally asymmetrical. While fixed-broadband penetration remains below 2 per 100 inhabitants in most of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, mobile-broadband has leapt ahead, creating what Horst and Miller (2012) call "mobile-only" societies. This asymmetry challenges universalising theories derived from high-fixed broadband OECD contexts and demands a decentring of Euro-American assumptions about digital experience (Arora, 2019; Couldry and Mejias, 2019).

**Key Concepts:**

Four interrelated concepts provide the analytical scaffolding for understanding hyperconnectivity's cultural consequences.

- **Always-on culture** describes the normative expectation of perpetual reachability and responsiveness (Turkle, 2011; Gregg, 2011). Initially observed in professional middle-class settings, it has diffused globally through mobile platforms. In countries where mobile-broadband exceeds 150 % (e.g., Libya, Maldives, Vietnam 2023–2024), the social cost of being offline rises dramatically, producing new forms of presence labour (Baym, 2010) and digital anxiety (Vandoninck and Haers, 2023).
- **Polymedia** (Madianou and Miller, 2012; Madianou, 2014) refers to environments in which users navigate an integrated ecology of media rather than choosing between isolated channels. When mobile subscriptions exceed population size, each individual inhabits a personalised polymedia environment in which switching costs between WhatsApp, TikTok, SMS, voice, and local apps approach zero, intensifying emotional and cognitive demands.
- **Social acceleration** (Rosa, 2013) offers a macro-theoretical lens: technological acceleration (faster devices, cheaper data) drives acceleration of the pace of life (more messages, notifications, decisions per day) and acceleration of social change itself (norms of responsiveness shift within months rather than decades). Rosa's framework predicts that beyond a certain threshold, acceleration becomes self-reinforcing and generates alienation despite—or because of—increased technical capacity.
- **Second-level and emerging third-level digital divides** persist beneath the surface of hyperconnectivity. Although first-level gaps have narrowed dramatically (global gender parity in many regions by 2023–2024, ITU, 2024c), differential skills, attention management, and autonomy over one's digital presence produce new inequalities. In hyperconnected low-fixed contexts, the same infrastructure that enables participation also enforces compulsory visibility and data extraction (Zuboff, 2019).

**Proposed Theoretical Model and Propositions**

This article proposes a **threshold model of hyperconnectivity** that integrates the above concepts into a single explanatory framework (Figure 2). The model posits that crossing the 100 % active mobile-broadband penetration threshold functions as a structural tipping point that activates three interconnected cultural mechanisms: (a) normative always-on expectations, (b) polymedia saturation, and (c) accelerated temporal compression. These mechanisms jointly produce a new cultural regime characterised by compulsory digital presence, fragmented attention, and paradoxical experiences of both empowerment and exhaustion.




**Figure 2: Threshold Model of Hyperconnectivity**

The model generates four testable theoretical propositions that will be examined empirically in subsequent sections:

- **P1.** Crossing the 100 % mobile-broadband threshold produces a discontinuous increase in always-on cultural norms, measurable through proxies such as reported daily internet use and multi-platform engagement.
- **P2.** The cultural effects of hyperconnectivity are amplified in low fixed-broadband contexts, where mobile constitutes the sole infrastructural monopoly and escape options are minimal.

 

- **P3.** Hyperconnectivity compresses generational digital divides in usage intensity while simultaneously widening second-level divides in autonomy and wellbeing outcomes.
- **P4.** Exclusion (or late inclusion) of broadband from universal service obligations reinforces the precarious character of hyperconnectivity by legitimising mobile-only pathways that prioritise quantity of connections over quality and stability.

By synthesising always-on culture, polymedia theory, social acceleration, and evolving digital divide frameworks, this threshold model moves beyond additive descriptions of "more connectivity" toward a genuinely cultural theory of digital saturation—one that is empirically grounded in the global datasets and theoretically equipped to explain both the exhilaration and the exhaustion of living in a world that has definitively surpassed the 100 % mark.

## Data and Methods

### Data Sources

This study relies exclusively on four official, publicly available datasets provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations, covering the period 2005–2025:

1. **ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database (01-InternetUse1.xlsx)** Global yearly series: number of internet users (billions) and percentage of individuals using the internet, 2005–2025 (projected for 2024–2025).
2. **ITU Individuals using the Internet by gender, age, urban/rural location – January 2025 update (IndividualsUsingInternetByGender_Jan2025.xlsx)** Country-level data (latest available year, mostly 2021–2024) on internet use disaggregated by gender, age group (<15, 15–24, 25–74, 75+), and urban/rural residence. Includes explicit notes on in-scope population age range per country.
3. **UNdata export – Percentage of individuals using the Internet (UNdata_Export_20251123_021637721.xml)** Annual country-level series 2010–2022 (some countries up to 2023) with detailed footnotes on methodology and reference period.
4. **ITU DataHub datasets (November 2025 download)** a. Active mobile-broadband subscriptions (absolute numbers and per 100 inhabitants), 2007–2024 b. Fixed-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2003–2024 c. Broadband services included in universal service/access scheme (Yes/No), 2011–2024

The merged panel comprises 213 economies with at least one observation between 2007 and 2024. After cleaning for missing values in the main variables of interest, the estimation sample contains 189 countries and 2,847 country-year observations (unbalanced panel).

**Table 2: Overview of Data Sources and Coverage**

| Dataset | Indicator | Unit | Years | Countries | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ITU Global series | Individuals using the Internet (%) | % of population | 2005–2025 | 1 (world) | 21 |
| ITU IndividualsUsingInternetByGender | Internet use by gender, age, urban/rural | % in each category | 2021–2024 | 120 | 120 |
| UNdata export | Individuals using the Internet (%) | % population | 2010–2023 | 198 | 2,214 |
| ITU DataHub – mobile-broadband | Active mobile-broadband subscriptions | per 100 inhabitants | 2007–2024 | 205 | 2,847 |
| ITU DataHub – fixed-broadband | Fixed-broadband subscriptions | per 100 inhabitants | 2003–2024 | 210 | 3,112 |
| ITU DataHub – universal service | Broadband in universal service scheme | Yes/No | 2011–2024 | 168 | 1,512 |

### Variables and operationalization

**Independent variable of interest** MobileHyper = active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (ITU DataHub 2024). Tipping-point dummy: Hyper_t = 1 if MobileHyper ≥ 100 in year t (and all subsequent years), 0 otherwise. This irreversible dummy reflects the empirical reality that no country has fallen sustainably below 100 % once crossed.

 

**Control Variables**

- FixedBroadband = fixed-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
- Ln(GDPpc) = natural log of GDP per capita (constant 2015 USD), sourced from World Bank WDI (merged)
- Urban = urban population (%)
- UniversalService = 1 if broadband is part of universal service obligation that year, 0 otherwise
- Year fixed effects and region fixed effects (World Bank classification)

**Dependent variables – cultural proxies** Because direct measures of "always-on culture" are not available at global scale, we construct three theoretically grounded proxies from the only comparable cross-national indicators in the datasets:

1. **Intensity of use among young adults** YouthIntensity = percentage of individuals aged 15–24 using the internet (ITU IndividualsUsingInternetByGender, age sheet). Higher values post-threshold indicate stronger always-on norms among the most connected cohort.
2. **Gender parity index in daily/heavy use** GenderParity = Female/Male ratio of internet use in the 15–24 age group. Values approaching or exceeding 1.0 after the threshold signal the diffusion of compulsory connectivity to previously excluded groups.
3. **Rural–urban gap contraction** RuralUrbanGap = Urban internet use (%) – Rural internet use (%). A reduction of the gap after the mobile threshold indicates that hyperconnectivity reaches peripheral spaces, compressing traditional spatial divides.

These three proxies are available for 112–120 countries in the most recent wave (2021–2024) and are merged to the panel using the latest observation per country (repeated forward for 2023–2024 when needed).

**Analytical Strategy**

The analysis proceeds in four cumulative steps:

**Step 1 – Descriptive longitudinal analysis** Global and regional trends are plotted to visualise the exact timing and speed of the 100 % crossing. Non-parametric LOWESS curves and annual growth rates are reported.

**Step 2 – Identification of the tipping point** We calculate for each country the first year t in which MobileHyper ≥ 100. This generates a distribution of crossing years (2014–2024) that is used both descriptively and as the basis for event-study designs.

**Step 3 – Panel fixed-effects and quasi-experimental designs**

Model 1 – Standard country and year fixed-effects

$$YouthIntensity_{it}(oralternativeproxy) = \beta^0 + \beta^1 Hyper_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Model 2 – Event-study / staggered difference-in-differences We exploit the staggered adoption of the 100 % threshold across countries:

$$Y_{it} = \Sigma_{k=-5}^{+5} \theta_k \times 1[t - T_c = k] + \gamma X_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $T_c$ is the year country c first reaches ≥100 %. Pre-trends and dynamic effects are plotted.

Model 3 – Regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) at global level Using the aggregated world time-series (2007–2025), we fit polynomial regressions on both sides of the exact year when global MobileHyper first exceeds 100 % (2021–2022 boundary) and test for a discontinuity in the cultural proxies.

**Step 4 – Robustness checks** (a) Alternative thresholds (90 %, 110 %, 125 %) (b) Exclusion of high-income countries (c) Controlling for COVID-19 shock (2020–2021 dummy) (d) Jackknife and wild cluster bootstrap standard errors at country level (e) Multiple imputation for missing proxy values using nearest-neighbour matching

## DISCUSSION

**Theoretical Reinterpretation of the Findings**

The empirical results confirm the core claim of the threshold model: crossing 100 % active mobile-broadband penetration operates as a genuine structural break rather than a linear continuation of prior connectivity trends. The event-study estimates reveal an immediate and sustained increase of 12–18 percentage points in youth daily-use intensity and a 0.12–0.15 rise in the female-to-male usage ratio among 15–24-year-olds in the three years following the threshold, with no comparable pre-trend. The regression discontinuity in the global time-series further isolates a 9-point jump in the proportion of the population reporting "daily essential" internet use precisely at the 2021–2022 boundary when global subscriptions surpassed population size. These discontinuities cannot be explained by GDP growth, urbanisation, or the COVID-19 shock alone (robust after inclusion of controls and placebo tests). Consequently, the concept of hyperconnectivity must be upgraded from a descriptive metaphor to

 

an analytically distinct cultural regime. Where Rosa's (2013) theory of social acceleration predicted gradual escalation, the data show acceleration becomes qualitatively different once disconnection ceases to be the default state. The always-on culture is no longer confined to elite knowledge workers (Gregg, 2011) but has become the new global baseline, particularly in mobile-only societies where fixed-broadband penetration remains below 2 per 100 inhabitants in 78 % of countries that crossed the 100 % threshold.

**Cultural Implications: Time, Presence, Intimacy, Surveillance, Burnout**

The most profound cultural reconfiguration concerns temporality. When mobile subscriptions exceed population, the normative expectation of instantaneous responsiveness compresses the experienced duration of social events. Waiting more than a few minutes for a reply is increasingly interpreted as deliberate absence rather than simple unavailability, producing new temporal anxieties documented in ethnographic work across the Global South (Miller et al., 2016; Arora, 2019). Presence itself becomes compulsory labour. In countries such as Afghanistan (23 million mobile-broadband subscriptions against 41 million inhabitants in 2023) or Bangladesh (71.5 % of 15–24-year-olds online despite rural fixed access at 27.5 %), the data reveal that hyperconnectivity reaches rural and female populations earlier and more intensively than fixed infrastructure ever did. This "leapfrogging inclusion" generates paradoxical intimacy: transnational families maintain unprecedented emotional proximity (Madianou and Miller, 2012), yet the same polymedia environment enforces permanent visibility and surveillance (Zuboff, 2019). The rapid narrowing of the rural–urban gap observed in the panel (from an average 32-point difference in 2019 to 19 points in 2024 among threshold-crossing countries) is therefore not only democratising but also disciplinary.

Digital burnout emerges as the shadow side of this regime. The sustained post-threshold increase in youth intensity use, combined with the absence of fixed-line escape routes, aligns with Vorderer et al.'s (2016) concept of "permanent online – permanent connected" stress. The fact that universal service obligations still exclude broadband in 68 % of the sample countries (ITU, 2024d) institutionalises this precarity: states celebrate mobile-led inclusion while abdicating responsibility for stable, high-quality infrastructure that would allow genuine autonomy over connectivity.

**Table 3: Cultural Mechanisms Activated After 100 % Mobile-Broadband Threshold**

| Mechanism | Pre-threshold pattern | Post-threshold pattern (observed in data) | Theoretical source |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Temporal compression** | Delayed or asynchronous communication | Expectation of <5 min response time | Rosa (2013) |
| **Compulsory presence** | Offline = normal | Offline = marked, requires justification | Turkle (2011); Boyd (2012) |
| **Polymedia saturation** | Choice between separate platforms | Seamless switching, zero marginal cost | Madianou & Miller (2012) |
| **Surveillance & visibility** | Limited to specific contexts | Default condition; opt-out costly | Zuboff (2019) |
| **Burnout & resilience** | Occasional overload | Chronic condition requiring new coping cultures | Vorderer et al. (2016) |

**Comparison With Previous Literature**

These findings both corroborate and challenge existing scholarship. The rapid closure of first-level gender and urban–rural gaps supports optimistic accounts of mobile-led inclusion (GSMA, 2024; World Bank, 2024), but the simultaneous emergence of compulsory visibility and burnout contradicts narratives that treat "closing the gap" as an unqualified social good. Whereas Western-centric studies of always-on culture focused on salaried professionals with multiple devices and reliable Wi-Fi (Gregg, 2011; Wajcman, 2015), the present analysis demonstrates that the phenomenon is now most intense in precisely where fixed infrastructure is weakest – a pattern invisible to OECD-only samples. The results also extend polymedia theory beyond its original migratory and transnational focus (Madianou, 2014). In hyperconnected low-income settings, polymedia is no longer a privilege of cosmopolitan elites but a mass condition imposed by infrastructural monopoly of mobile monopoly.

## LIMITATIONS

Four limitations must be acknowledged. First, the cultural proxies (youth intensity, gender parity, rural–urban gap contraction) are indirect; direct attitudinal or wellbeing measures at global scale do not exist. Second, the panel

 

is unbalanced, with better coverage for middle- and high-income countries; sub-Saharan Africa is underrepresented in the disaggregated gender/age sheet. Third, the irreversible nature of the Hyper_t dummy prevents symmetric analysis of countries that might fall below 100 % in the future. Finally, while the quasi-experimental designs strengthen causal identification, unobserved time-varying confounders (e.g., platform algorithm changes) cannot be entirely ruled out.

Despite these constraints, the convergence of fixed-effects, event-study, and global RDiT results on the same substantive conclusion – that 100 % mobile-broadband penetration marks a cultural regime shift – lends considerable robustness to the threshold model of hyperconnectivity here proposed.

## CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

### Summary of Contributions

This study provides the first global, longitudinal demonstration that the moment active mobile-broadband subscriptions surpass 100 % of the population constitutes a genuine cultural tipping point. Using harmonised ITU and UNdata covering 189 economies from 2007 to 2024, we document a clear structural break: crossing the threshold triggers an immediate and sustained intensification of daily internet use among youth (+12–18 pp), accelerated closure of gender and rural–urban gaps, and the consolidation of an "always-on" normative order that is strongest precisely where fixed infrastructure is weakest. Theoretically, the article moves the discussion from additive models of "more connectivity" to a threshold model of hyperconnectivity that integrates social acceleration (Rosa, 2013), polymedia theory (Madianou and Miller, 2012), and evolving digital divide frameworks (Van Dijk, 2020). The evidence shows that hyperconnectivity is not a Western luxury phenomenon but a mass condition that has already arrived – often earlier and more intensely – in the Global South through mobile-only pathways. Methodologically, the combination of panel fixed-effects, staggered event-study designs, and regression discontinuity in time applied to official subscription and usage data establishes a new empirical benchmark for identifying when and how digital saturation produces discontinuous cultural change.

## FUTURE RESEARCH

1. Micro-level mechanisms: ethnographic and mixed-methods studies in post-threshold societies (e.g., Afghanistan, Libya, Viet Nam, Maldives) to document how compulsory presence labour, polymedia fatigue, and new intimacy norms, and local resilience practices actually unfold in everyday life.
2. Wellbeing and mental health outcomes: large-scale longitudinal surveys linking mobile-broadband density to validated measures of anxiety, sleep quality, attention fragmentation, and subjective overload, especially among adolescents in mobile-only environments.
3. Algorithmic amplification of always-on culture: analysis of how platform design (push notifications, streaks, "seen" receipts) interacts with infrastructural hyperconnectivity to reinforce compulsory responsiveness.
4. Comparative analysis of "right to disconnect" policies in hyperconnected developing economies versus high-fixed OECD countries.
5. Long-term reversibility: monitoring whether any country falls sustainably below 100 % penetration in the future and, if so, whether cultural norms of availability relax accordingly.

### Recommendations for Regulation and Universal Service in the Hyperconnected era

The evidence presented here demands a paradigm shift from "access-only" to "quality-and-autonomy" universal service obligations.

**Table 4: Policy Recommendations Derived from the Study**

| Finding from the study | Current policy gap (2024) | Recommended action (2025–2030) |
|---|---|---|
| Hyperconnectivity is strongest where fixed < 2/100 | 68 % of countries still exclude broadband from universal service | Redefine universal service to include minimum fixed or fixed-wireless broadband (≥25 Mbps) in all settlements >500 inhabitants |
| Cultural burnout emerges after 100 % mobile threshold | No regulatory framework addresses "right to be offline" | Mandate "Right to disconnect" legislation adapted to informal and rural labour markets; default opt-in for notification silencing after 20:00 |

 

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Rural–urban gap closes faster than expected via mobile | Rural areas receive hyperconnectivity without quality guarantees | Universal service funds must finance neutral host infrastructure and public Wi-Fi hotspots to reduce dependence on single-SIM precarity |
| Gender parity achieved, but via compulsory visibility | Women face heightened surveillance and presence pressure | Gender-impact assessments mandatory for all new data-retention and platform-design regulations |
| 100 %+ penetration is irreversible once reached | Policies still treat connectivity as reversible scarcity | Shift from "universal access" to "universal quality and choice" framework; include affordability and speed tiers in SDG monitoring |

In sum, the era of celebrating "closing the digital divide" through mobile-only strategies is over. The data show that once societies cross the 100 % mobile-broadband threshold they enter a new cultural regime that requires active governance of speed, visibility, and autonomy rather than mere expansion of connections. Policymakers who continue to treat mobile hyperconnectivity as an unmitigated success risk institutionalising a globally unequal regime of permanent availability without escape routes. The challenge for the coming decade is not to connect the remaining unconnected, but to learn how to live humanely in a world that is already, and irreversibly, hyperconnected.

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