

The Attack on National Identity: Soviet Narratives and Kazakh Tragedy

Kenzhegul Tergembay^{1*}, Khassen Moldabayev², Gakku Abulkassimova³, Sandugash Tulebayeva⁴,
Ainur Abdrakhmanova⁵, Assylzhan Irgussayeva⁶, Akmaral Mamankul⁷

¹ PhD, Faculty of Journalism and Social Sciences L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University Republic of Kazakhstan, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2441-9003>, Email: tergembay@mail.ru

² Doctoral student Faculty of Journalism and Social Sciences L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Republic of Kazakhstan ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8343-933X>, Email: info@semeitr.kz

³ Deputy Dean of the Higher School of Education, Non-Profit Joint Stock Company "Shakarim University of Semey". Master of Philological Sciences Republic of Kazakhstan, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8601-7572>, Email: Gakku_aa@mail.ru

⁴ Senior lecturer, Taraz University named after M.Kh.Dulaty, Faculty of Philology and Humanities, Republic of Kazakhstan, Email: sk.tulebayeva@dulaty.kz

⁵ Senior lecturer of the Faculty of Journalism and Social Sciences L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Republic of Kazakhstan, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2149-8357>, Email: abdrakhmanova2191@gmail.com

⁶ Doctoral student Faculty of Journalism and Social Sciences L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Republic of Kazakhstan, Email: aselekbalapam@yandex.ru

⁷ PhD, Faculty of Journalism and Social Sciences L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Republic of Kazakhstan, Email: akmaral584@mail.ru

*Corresponding Author: tergembay@mail.ru

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the informational and ideological influences on national identity in the history of Kazakhstan during the Soviet period. The study, which covers collectivization, the Holodomor, the Basmachi movement, and the political repressions of the 1920s and 1930s, reveals the impact of the official narrative of the Soviet regime on the sociocultural structure of Kazakh society. The author explores the characteristics of the Soviet narrative through a one-sided interpretation of historical data, information manipulation, and methods of subjugating public consciousness to ideology. The literature review systematizes scientific works covering economic, political, and cultural aspects, and describes the impact of censorship in the media and literature on national identity. The results of the study show that the Soviet discourse limited the creative freedom of the national intelligentsia and distorted historical consciousness. At the same time, it has been revealed that the long-term impact of the official information narrative has been preserved in the historical memory of modern Kazakhstani society. The discussion shows that the Soviet narrative functioned as a direct and indirect attack on national identity at the ideological, cultural, and psychological levels. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the comparative study of narratives in the media and literature provides an important theoretical basis for protecting national identity and developing modern cultural discourse.

Keywords: Soviet Narrative, National Identity, Kazakh Tragedy, Ideology, Media, And Historical Consciousness.

INTRODUCTION

The history of Kazakhstan during the Soviet era is characterized by complex issues related to the preservation and transformation of national identity. The collectivization, the Holodomor, the Basmachi movement, and the Soviet repressive policies of the 1920s and 1930s had a significant impact on the social, economic, and cultural

structure of Kazakh society. The Soviet regime propagated this period through its ideological narrative, distorting events and implementing new methods of information control. The main goal of the narrative was to subjugate the people to the authorities and prevent the formation of a national identity (Abylkhozhin et al., 2019a; Sailaubay, 2021a). This article highlights the key elements of Soviet national policy on this issue, including the concepts that shape ethnic identity: indigenous ethnic qualities, backward peoples, the friendship of peoples, and the justification of the cultural and linguistic dominance of Russians (Monastireva-Ansdell, 2017: 228). A distinctive feature of the Soviet narrative was the maintenance of ideological control over people through the one-sided presentation of information. For example, the manipulation of data about the change of leadership in the Central Statistical Administration in 1925, the famine of 1929-1932, and the suppression of more than 380 uprisings contributed to the spread of the myth of "bread abundance" (The Tragedy of the Soviet Village, 1999: 17a). This narrative became not only a tool for enslaving the people, but also a means of controlling and managing the national intelligentsia. Thus, the analysis of the narrative that has emerged in Kazakh society is crucial, as it demonstrates the direct and indirect encroachments on the values of national identity. This study, which examines the Kazakh tragedy through the lens of the Soviet narrative, aims to explore the interaction between media and ideology.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a historical-analytical method that combines archival data, published sources, and secondary scientific information to trace the mechanisms by which Soviet policies undermined the national identity of the Kazakhs. Special attention is given to the 1920s and 1930s, a period marked by collectivization, forced sedentarization, and the Holodomor, as well as the later Soviet decades, when censorship and ideological control shaped public memory. A comparative approach was used to compare the Kazakh case with broader Soviet practices, such as the suppression of the Tambov uprising or the Basmachi movement, in order to highlight both the general strategies of repression and the specific national aspects of the Kazakh tragedy. The study also used discursive analysis of Soviet propaganda materials, statistical reports, and memoirs to identify how official sources concealed, distorted, or reinterpreted the scale of human losses. The theoretical framework is based on Noam Chomsky's concept of "consent production," which allows for a critical understanding of how media and state-controlled communications shape public consciousness and legitimize coercive policies. Additionally, quantitative demographic analysis was conducted to assess the consequences of famine and repression. Population statistics, censuses (including the banned 1937 census), and migration data were cross-analyzed to reconstruct the scale of the demographic disaster in Kazakhstan. Finally, a longitudinal approach was taken to trace the continuity of repressive strategies from the famine of the 1920s to the December 1986 uprising in Almaty, thus placing.

DISCUSSION

The results of the study show that Soviet narratives not only described historical events, but also actively shaped national identity and cultural identification. From this perspective, the narrative functioned not only as a means of communication, but also as an ideological mechanism. As a result of the Soviet era's policies aimed at erasing national identity, modern Kazakhstani society faces linguistic tensions (Ten, 2024: 346) and challenges in preserving cultural values and self-identification. State-controlled historical education is used as a main tool for strengthening national identity, especially in newly independent states that are going through state-building processes (Korostelina, 2011: 7). However, when discussing Kazakhstan's post-Soviet identity, scholars often view the process of "Kazakhization" as a simple factual phenomenon, while a deeper meaning.

The historical influence of the Soviet era has had a significant impact on the linguistic, cultural, and social structures of Kazakh society. During this period, the use of the Kazakh language was limited in official and educational settings, leading to a tendency towards distancing from national values. These consequences persist today, complicating both the linguistic environment and issues of cultural identity. Furthermore, the migration policies of the Soviet era and the trends of urbanization have contributed to the transformation of national identity. The movement to urban centers has weakened traditional social ties and altered cultural practices and linguistic competencies among the population. These factors manifest themselves in modern Kazakhstani society as a partial erosion or modification of certain aspects of national identity.

From this perspective, the social and cultural changes identified in the study can be seen as long-term consequences of the Soviet period. Analyzing these trends is crucial for planning modern state and cultural policies, as they directly impact the stability of national culture and the preservation of linguistic potential. The analysis of the relationship between the Kazakh tragedy and Soviet narratives revealed several key aspects:

- Ideological propaganda - Official narratives sought to subjugate the population to Soviet ideology, and the selective presentation of historical data led to the weakening of national identity.

- Censorship in the media and literature – restrictions on creative freedom in Kazakh literature and journalism contributed to the spread of official narratives. The contradiction between intellectual and official narratives determined the content and form of cultural products.

- International scientific perspective – researchers argue that the policies imposed on all Turkic peoples in the USSR were deliberately designed as part of a broader strategy of “divide and conquer” (Yılmaz, 2013: 511).
- Long-term impact – the psychological and cultural consequences of these stories remain significant today, and some of the facts about these national tragedies are still not fully understood. For example, some Kazakhstani scholars note that when commemorating the victims of Soviet atrocities, statements are often used that avoid overt nationalism (Kundakbayeva and Kasymova, 2016: 611).

This analysis shows that the study of narratives goes beyond the collection of historical facts and allows us to assess their informational and ideological influence on national identity. Additionally, a comparative analysis of media and literature narratives provides important insights into the development of contemporary journalism and cultural discourse in Kazakhstan.

The condemnation of the colonial ideology of the Soviet system is not unique to Kazakhstan; similar patterns can be observed in studies conducted in other countries. For example, following Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Russian and pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians and media outlets have accused Ukraine of committing genocide (Dreyer, 2018: 545). This is certainly applicable to Ukraine, a country with a complex and controversial legacy that affects the historical memory, language, religion, and culture of its regions (Volchuk, 2000: 671). Future research would benefit from conducting comparative studies with other post-Soviet states to better understand the extent of genocidal policies against various ethnic groups.

RESULTS

During its existence, the Soviet Union repeatedly modernized its style of governance, with one general secretary succeeding another. While television broadcasts enthusiastically reported on the new achievements of the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there were frequent outbreaks of resistance across the country, with civil unrest and mass protests. Such open dissent was not just ignored, but harshly suppressed (kulturologia.ru). The reforms implemented by the Soviet authorities had a profound impact on the traditional way of life of the Kazym Khanty, an indigenous people of the Ob-Irtysh tundra. During the planned collectivization, efforts were made to integrate them into mainstream cultural values, thereby shielding them from the influence of kulak and shamanic practices (kulturologia.ru).

In the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks' food policy, based primarily on the forcible confiscation of grain from the peasants, pushed rural communities to the brink of physical survival. "Among the series of peasant uprisings in Soviet Russia during the Civil War, the Tambov Uprising stood out for its scale and mass participation: the insurgency spread across three provinces, with a total of 40,000 participants. The rebels acted in accordance with their political agenda and were well-organized. The reasons that prompted the Tambov peasants to join the armed struggle against the communist authorities have been thoroughly studied. The main reason was the food procurement policy, specifically the coercive methods used in its implementation" (Bezgin, 2018).

After the October Revolution, the establishment of Soviet power in Central Asia, and then in the Turkestan region, was received extremely positively by Russian historians. According to these historians, the Soviets liberated numerous peoples from the feudal oppression of the Russian Empire and granted them the right to political self-determination. In the article “How the Kazakh intelligentsia got on the Soviet blacklist” it is noted that “the famine of 1921 in Kazakhstan led to the death of up to 80% of livestock. By June 1922, the number of starving and sick people had reached 82% of the total population of Western Kazakhstan. The total number of starving people accounted for a third of the republic's population. In the fertile regions of Semipalatinsk and Akmola provinces, famine broke out due to the confiscation of 80% of agricultural surplus by food detachments. Measures to help the starving population were taken belatedly” (Sailaubay, 2021c).

However, such facts were ignored by the authorities. Since its founding in 1922, the USSR functioned as a multinational empire and a state system based on socialist internationalism. This ambiguous identity was enshrined in the status of the Union Republics, whose nominal autonomy did not exempt them from central control. Central Asia, in particular, served as an example of Soviet modernization, but at the same time it remained a remote periphery, which the capital's elite treated with the same condescension as remote regions of the Russian hinterland (Abylkhozhin et al., 2019: 272b).

The state of the Soviet economy during the New Economic Policy (NEP) was far from favorable. The destruction of industry and transportation, coupled with the need not only to rebuild these sectors of the national economy but also to resume industrialization, required significant resources that could only be obtained on the global market in exchange for grain, timber, and raw materials. Grain exports were resumed as soon as possible (in 1923) and immediately became an important source of industrial capital accumulation. Consequently, the issue

of grain procurement remained central to the relationship between the state and the countryside during the NEP period. The objective need to accelerate industrial development gave rise to government ambitions and plans that exceeded the actual capacity to export grain. [...] As for the miscalculations in the grain procurement plans for 1925, these plans were overestimated: "We were adjusted by 200 million poods," which resulted in a reduction of investments in industry from 1.1 billion rubles to 700-800 million rubles, "and the entire pace had to be suspended." However, the plans were adjusted without changing either the overall economic policy or the system of grain procurement in rural areas (The Tragedy of the Soviet Village, 1999: 17c).

However, the matter was not limited to simply adjusting the plans to match the actual capabilities. The Central Statistical Office was held accountable not for exaggerating, but for underestimating the production capacity and, consequently, the government's grain purchases, which were vital for the country. On December 10, 1925, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party(b) held a discussion on "The work of the Central State Duma in the field of grain and fodder balance," during which the top party leadership subjected P.I. Popov, a prominent zemstvo statistician who had headed the Central State Duma since 1918, to defending low grain production in direct dispute with Stalin and refusing to recognize the existence of huge Kulak farms. grain stocks — for which he was subjected to ideological condemnation and was removed from his post on the same day (Tragedy of the Soviet Village, 1999: 17d). We deliberately focus on the episode of the change of leadership of the CSA in December 1925, as from that moment it was subordinated to political directives and began to provide data favorable to the authorities, which played a significant role in the rural tragedy.

As a result, firstly, estimates of grain production were increased by an average of 10-20%. Secondly, the indicators of the so-called "invisible grain reserves" among peasants sharply increased, which fundamentally changed the situation on the grain market. The grain factor played a decisive role in the dramatic developments in the countryside throughout 1927. The myth of grain abundance, based on implausible statistical exaggerations, was intended to convince the ruling elite—and, consequently, the leading social force they controlled, the Bolshevik Party—that sufficient grain could be obtained to finally resolve the issue of resources for accelerated industrialization and national defense. At the same time, Stalin's leadership had to convince the party-state elite of the need to achieve these goals and to purchase grain from the peasants by any means necessary to achieve the "current objectives." The argument of external threats, particularly the imminent danger of war, was constantly used to justify these measures (Tragedy of the Soviet Village, 1999: 17e).

As a result, the policy of grain procurement became strategic and was seen as a key tool for implementing plans for accelerated industrialization. The harvested grain was intended for export in order to purchase industrial equipment, thus providing a powerful impetus for industrialization and gradually repaying the forced loan through the operation of new enterprises that produced goods to meet the needs of the rural population (Tragedy of the Soviet Village, 1999: 17f).

Accordingly, the mobilization of grain resources was viewed not only as an economic necessity, but also as a political imperative, which was reflected in the intensified ideological rhetoric. The ideological campaign, which focused on external threats, was necessary for Stalin and his associates to achieve their internal goals, primarily to eliminate any opposition and consolidate power in their hands (The Tragedy of the Soviet Village, 1999: 17g). At the same time, this policy had a direct impact on the national peripheries, where social discontent fueled protest movements.

During this period, this dynamic served as a powerful catalyst for the rise of the national liberation movement among the indigenous peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, leading to the emergence of the Basmachi, a paramilitary guerrilla resistance. The Soviets viewed the Basmachi as a "reactionary movement led by local feudal elites and the Muslim clergy, while the working peasantry unconditionally sided with the new government" (Stepanov, 2016b).

However, alternative assessments are presented in historiography, emphasizing the scale of repressions against the local population. In the article "The Basmachi Movement in Southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia," Valery Stepanov notes that "some materials indicate a colossal confrontation between the Soviet government and the broad strata of the local population ... we observe the systematic destruction of the working peasantry, rather than the elimination of the Basmachi. The institution of hostage-taking was an important element of the Red Terror policy in Central Asia" (Stepanov, 2016c). In the late 1920s and early 1930s, more than 300 uprisings were recorded in the republic, and their participants were considered to be Basmachi, which means bandits and terrorists who were to be eliminated. One of the methods used to combat the Basmachis, or so-called "extremists or terrorists," was a local Soviet decree that ordered the capture and execution of hostages: "If the leaders surrender within 15 days and lay down their arms, they will be pardoned; otherwise, their property will be confiscated, and if active resistance continues, the hostages will be executed" (Stepanov, 2016d). This method, based on terror and intimidation, was aimed at undermining the social base of the resistance and demonstrated the severity of the Soviet authorities' punitive policies.

Another method of suppressing the Basmachi movement was famine, which paralyzed the work of cities and villages throughout the republic. Gradually, the uprisings began to subside. ... "According to various estimates by historians, between 1931 and 1933, between one and three and a half million people died of starvation in Kazakhstan" (Pyatetskaya, 2018). It can be said that the authorities achieved their goal by suppressing the manifestations of the national-patriotic movement. The indigenous population had few opportunities to resist, as their main concern was survival in the face of famine. By 1933, only a tenth of the original 40 million livestock remained.

In September 1990, Komsomolskaya Pravda published Alexander Solzhenitsyn's article "How Should We Organize Russia?" (Solzhenitsyn, 1990), which caused a wide public outcry. In Kazakhstan, this publication was met with negative reactions. In response, the renowned writer Anuar Turlybekovich Alimzhanov wrote in his article "A Severe Test": "To this day, the people still remember the Stalinist genocide, which is referred to as the 'Goloshchekin Holodomor.'" From 1929 to 1933, people were deprived of their livestock and forced into collective farms; millions of steppe dwellers perished..." (Alimzhanov, 1988: 26).

"Of the many and varied disasters that befall humanity, four are probably the most frequent and destructive, as well as the most instructive and significant: wars and revolutions, famines, and epidemics. These four "monsters" are the subject of this study, focusing on their impact on our thought processes and behavior, our social organization, and our cultural life. To solve this problem, we start by studying their impact on our fundamental mental processes, and then move on to their impact on behavior, social organization, and culture" (Sorokin, 2003).

Collectivization swept through the Kazakh countryside like a devastating tornado. Unprecedented damage has been inflicted on animal husbandry. Thus, the emergence of the Basmachi movement and the widespread resistance of the local population were directly caused by the Holodomor organized by the Soviet authorities and the repressive measures imposed against starving refugees who fled abroad in search of survival.

Based on the above data, the study showed that Soviet narratives influenced the national identity of Kazakh society in several key ways. First, the ideological narratives disseminated through the official press and Soviet literature were aimed at manipulating the historical consciousness of the population. For example, information about the famine and uprisings of 1929-1933 was often presented in the form of "partial data" or completely distorted reports. These narratives prevented the public from distinguishing between the people's tragic experiences and official documents, leading to an ideologically biased interpretation of historical events (Abylkhozhin et al., 2019). In his book "Living Memory: Stalinism in Kazakhstan," in the chapter dedicated to collectivization in Kazakhstan, Zhulduzbek Abylkhozhin not only describes the extreme brutality of the repressions (90% of the livestock was destroyed during grain requisitions and sedentarization), but also provides specific rhetoric used by local authorities to justify attacks on local practices: "Don't let there be any excesses – don't leave any unglutes!" Here, the term "excesses," usually used to refer to excesses in the implementation of the collectivization program, actually meant the opposite: an attempt to legitimize the total confiscation of livestock on the grounds that private ownership was "undermining" livestock production throughout the country. The Kazakh authorities continued to achieve "dizzying success" long after Stalin's article in Pravda on March 2, 1930 (Abylkhozhin et al., 2019: 272d).

At first, the rural population responded to Soviet policies with mass sabotage. The forced policies of totalitarianism sparked resistance. Between 1929 and 1932, the people, who had not resisted the Bolshevik regime for about a decade, rose up in rebellion. The Kazakh steppe became a center of mass resistance. Over 380 uprisings, involving more than 80,000 people, protested against the Soviet government's violent policies. These uprisings were brutally suppressed (Silaubai, 2021).

In the 1920s and 1930s, all the peoples living under Soviet rule were subjected to totalitarian pressure, but this did not extinguish their national spirit. From 1921 to 1954, the number of people convicted as "enemies" of the Soviet government exceeded 3,777,000 in the USSR, including 642,000 who were executed. In Kazakhstan alone, more than 115,000 cases were initiated, of which approximately 27,000 were executed. These figures are based on currently available verified sources (Silaubay, 2021e).

The forced policy of totalitarianism led to resistance. The population, which had not resisted the Bolshevik regime for almost ten years, rose up in rebellion between 1929 and 1932. The Kazakh steppe became a center of mass resistance. More than 380 uprisings, involving over 80,000 people, protested against the Soviet government's violent policies. These uprisings were brutally suppressed (Silaubay, 2021f).

The anti-peasant repressive policy under the slogan of "glasnost" became particularly noticeable after the collapse of the Soviet regime and Kazakhstan's independence. At this time, many previously classified archives began to be declassified, including the materials of the so-called "census" (the 1937 census revealed a catastrophic decline in the population, and therefore its materials were not published and were sealed in secret archives; the census developers were eliminated, and the population of the new 1939 census was falsified). However, many available sources still indicate discrepancies in the figures, significant statistical errors, and so on. This is not surprising, as eyewitnesses recall that the streets of cities such as Alma-Ata, Semipalatinsk, and Frunze, as well as

railway stations and the “great Stalinist industrial facilities,” were littered with the bodies of Holodomor victims. They were loaded onto carts, transported to another location, and buried in mass graves without registration. The number of victims was often estimated “by eye” (many reports mention, for example, that “approximately” so many bodies were found at a certain station, or that “approximately” so many people died of starvation in a certain area, etc.). (Abylkhozhin et al., 2019: 72e). In the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet population perceived the events as a struggle against “enemies of the people” and Basmachi rebels. After the December events, there were no more uprisings. However, the declared policy of perestroika and glasnost later began to reveal the “dark spots” of history.

Secondly, the narrative also affected the relationship between the Soviet authorities and the Kazakh intelligentsia. Although Kazakh intellectuals and writers sought to preserve their national identity in their works, the power of official ideology forced them to censor their writings, thereby limiting their freedom of expression. This situation hindered the development of nuanced and multifaceted narratives in Kazakh literature and journalism. Another aspect of Soviet policy during this period was directed against the Kazakh intelligentsia, who were blacklisted by the authorities and subjected to mass repression. As Erlan Silaubay notes in his article “How the Kazakh Intelligentsia Ended up on the Soviet Blacklist – A Historical Overview”:

“...as for the events of the early 1920s, especially the process of forced Sovietization, the removal of the Alash-Orda leaders, who were well aware of their people’s hopes and difficulties, from power, and the appointment of current (Goloshchekin) and future executioners (Yezhov) to government positions in Kazakhstan. The Bolsheviks’ implementation of economic reforms in Kazakhstan through coercion, with little regard for or appreciation of the indigenous population’s traditional way of life, along with numerous other “innovations” of the Soviet regime, caused significant suffering” (Silaubay, 2021).

In the second half of the 1930s, repressions began in accordance with Mirzoyan's "plan." American linguist, philosopher, and public figure Noam Chomsky compiled a list of "10 Ways to Manipulate People" through the media. The seventh method was "Keeping People in Ignorance by Cultivating Mediocrity," which he explained as "Ensuring that people become incapable of understanding the techniques and manuals used to control and subjugate them" (Chomsky, 1980). Stalin and his entourage drove the population to the point where “people were unable to understand what was happening” (Ponzel, 2018).

In the Kazakh SSR, the method of “controlling and subjugating people to one’s will” persisted until the December 1986 events in Almaty. Only superficial information was presented in the press. Officially, it was claimed that there were no riots or protests in the USSR. “For Soviet historians, who have written numerous books and articles on the history of socialism in the USSR, the topic of violent social conflicts, particularly between the population and the authorities, was off-limits” (Kozlov, 1980b).

Russian-language publications, mainly the central ones, played the role of active supporters of routine thinking and the old, familiar order in their interpretation of the events of December. While the authorities used the police, armed with metal rods, to beat up demonstrators, the journalists of these publications acted as “militiamen” in the information space of the Union. From the very beginning, the speeches of Moscow journalists were characterized by striking unanimity and militancy. Most of the articles lacked a fair analysis of the events, instead focusing on accusations and denunciations. The December events were the most widely covered topic during this period. These efforts were effective, as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union officially classified the youth protests as “manifestations of Kazakh nationalism.”

In 1987, several employees of republican newspapers were punished for publishing photographs from the trials of a group of young participants in the December events. Turgakhun Nazarov, a former editor of *Znamya Kommunizma*, recalls: "The photographs taken by KazTAG's photojournalist were only published in the newspapers *Zhetysu*, *Ognia Alatau*, and *Kommunizm Tugi*. The republican newspapers, such as *Yegemen Kazakhstan* and *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, received KazTAG's report from the courtroom the day before without photographs and immediately published it. The photos published in the newspapers frightened not the people or the readers, but rather Colbin's team."

Thirdly, the long-term influence of narratives shaped by the media is still evident in the modern Kazakhstani public consciousness. The remnants of the Soviet narrative have led to the disregard or misinterpretation of certain historical data in the assessment of national tragedies. For example, many historical documents, although perceived by the public as “ideologically neutral,” were actually part of an information attack on national identity (Silubai, 2021i).

Kazakhstan continues to experience the long-term consequences of Soviet-era policies to this day. The forced collectivization, industrialization, forced resettlement, and ethno-demographic transformations implemented by the Soviet authorities have left a profound impact on the country's social structure, culture, and spiritual identity. This impact is particularly evident in the language environment, as although the Kazakh language has gained official status, its use in society remains limited, and the legacy of Russian language dominance continues to persist. This situation hinders the full development of a national identity and prevents the Kazakh language from fully fulfilling its socio-communicative function.

Moreover, urbanization and globalization have weakened traditional cultural values, accelerating the shift away from traditional practices. For example, there is a decline in interest among young people in family and domestic customs, while national clothing and cuisine remain largely symbolic. Additionally, the traditions of bureaucratic governance and authoritarian relationships inherited from the Soviet era continue to influence political culture. Consequently, modern Kazakhstani society is simultaneously striving to revive its national roots as an independent state while grappling with the sociocultural and political legacy of the Soviet era.

It is also evident that the current Russian government seeks to maintain its influence over the post-Soviet states that were once part of the USSR. For example, in 2017, a bill on patriotic education was introduced in the Russian State Duma, indicating the government's readiness to respond to external threats, including military and cultural challenges, in the long term. Russian scholars have described this initiative as a “patriotic turn,” analyzing how contemporary Russian authorities are shaping collective memory and how the Russian patriotic campaign is being perceived in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Kazakhstan (Kratokhvil and Shakhanova, 2020: 442).

CONCLUSION

The results of this study demonstrate that the narratives shaped by Soviet policies played a crucial role in the formation of Kazakh national identity and the perception of national tragedies. The official information discourse influenced the historical consciousness of the population by selectively presenting historical data to promote Soviet ideology. This process contributed to the formation of narratives in Kazakh literature and journalism at two levels: ideological and cultural.

The cultural and psychological impact of these narratives persists in modern Kazakhstani society. The one-sided perspectives imposed by the Soviet discourse hindered a comprehensive understanding of national tragedies, while restrictions on creative freedom in the media and literature reinforced the influence of these narratives. Moreover, while Kazakh intellectuals and literary figures attempted to preserve their national identity through their works, the pressure of official narratives limited their creative and informational autonomy.

In the current context, the study of narratives goes beyond the mere collection of historical facts and allows us to assess the informational and ideological impact on national identity. A comparative analysis of narratives in the media and literature provides an important scientific foundation for developing strategies aimed at preserving national identity in journalism, cultural discourse, and public consciousness in Kazakhstan. Thus, this study highlights the multifaceted role of narratives in Kazakhstani society and emphasizes the importance of strategically evaluating narratives in the media and literature to protect and strengthen national identity.

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