

The Dialectical Relationship between Strategic Preparedness and Nuclear Deterrence: A Study in the Principle of Extending Deterrence

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ABSTRACT

The extended deterrence is one of the principles in strategy adopted by some nuclear powers, especially due to the commitments of major nuclear powers, to provide a nuclear umbrella of protecting their allies and strategic partners from any external threats, which calls for or requires the availability of comprehensive, and multi-level strategic preparedness. From this point, the research sought to explore the dialectical relationship between the nature of strategic preparedness and the credibility of implementing extended deterrence, with a focus on the challenges that hinder this principle in match with the opportunities that enable its implementation to use their potential powerful of extended deterrence strategy. The premise of article stems from the question following: Is there a relationship between the strategic preparedness of nuclear powers and the principle of nuclear deterrence followed, especially if it is extended deterrence? The study concluded that the effectiveness of extended deterrence depends on the guarantor state's ability to achieve a coherent strategic preparedness that qualifies it to bear the consequences of adopting extended deterrence itself, within a complex international environment characterized by escalating traditional and non-traditional threats.

Keywords: Strategic preparedness, nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence.

INTRODUCTION

The principle of extended deterrence is one of the strategic principles adopted by some nuclear powers, especially for the major nuclear powers, to provide a nuclear reaction, for preserving or protecting their interests with allies and strategic partners, whenever they confront an external threats, which required the availability of comprehensive power, and multi-level strategic preparedness.

Objective

The research seeks to analyze the dialectical relationship between strategic preparedness and extended deterrence, by examining the nature of the interaction between them. It also aims to recognize the most important challenges that hinder the effectiveness of extended deterrence, while exploring the opportunities that nuclear states can leverage to enhance actively its implementation.

Importance

The importance of this research emerges from the escalation and diversity of traditional and non-traditional threats, which had significantly impacted rapid international transformations, These developments require specific deterrence measures to preserve collective interests, objectives, and commitments in protecting their allies and partners.

Problem Statement

The research revolves around answering the following questions: Is there a relationship between the nature of the strategic preparedness of nuclear powers and the principle of nuclear deterrence in use, especially when extended deterrence is considered? How does this relationship influence the understanding of opportunities and challenges in effectively applying this principle in the contemporary international security environment?

Hypothesis

The research is based on the dialectical relationship between the level of strategic preparedness possessed by nuclear powers and their ability to have a specific commitment for implementing the extended nuclear deterrence. Consequently, there is a relationship between the level of strategic preparedness possessed by nuclear powers and the extent of their ability to actually commit to adopt extended deterrence as an effective principle in its defense's strategy.

METHODOLOGY

In this research, resembling to verify the validity of the hypothesis, answering to the research problem presented, and to reach into the most prominent conclusions, by adopted the deductive approach. An analytical approach is also used to examine the opportunities for implementing expanded deterrence versus the challenges that might undermine its effectiveness or hinder its practical application in extended deterrence.

Research Limits

From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a period marked by significant transformations in the international order and the application of extended deterrence. Especially, this critical period witnessed significant transformations in the international order, by preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Direct deterrence often occurs during territorial disputes between neighboring states, where great powers such as the United States may not directly intervene, according to Arthur Huth; but prefer to implement extended deterrence against potential adversaries.

Research Structure

The research is organized into distinct items, each one contributing uniquely to the study's objectives. It begins by examining the concept of strategic preparedness and its various forms, aiming to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, it delves into an extended deterrence and its relationship with strategic preparedness, in order to analyze opportunities for implementing extended deterrence. Subsequently, the research addresses the challenges of implementing extended deterrence, considering available military resources, nuclear weapon complexities, and the priorities of defending national security. Finally, it assesses the capabilities and strategic effectiveness of extended deterrence.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In the context of the research, the levels of comprehensive strategic preparedness of nuclear powers, mean the greater an ability to adopt the extended deterrence against traditional and new competitors or opponents, and vice versa might possible right in the future.

The Concept of Strategic Preparedness:

The strategic preparedness refers to prior readiness to deal with various situations and circumstances, whether normal or emergency. Preparedness also takes various forms depending on the context in which it is applied, each of form plays a role in enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of confronting the threats and challenges. Types of preparedness cover multiple fields, such as military preparedness for defense, health preparedness to confront epidemics, educational preparedness to support the educational process, etc. Developing these types of preparedness is a strategic necessity to ensure stability and achieving objectives at the national and international levels.

Finally, the term "preparedness" is not limited to a particular scientific field; it is used in several aspects and contexts, including the following:

Educational Preparedness:

Educational preparedness is defined as a vital intellectual activity employed by an individual to develop educational skills, to meet the demands of the teaching and learning process. In other words, preparedness is "the

individual's qualification for a specific performance, based on previous acquisitions, including the ability to accomplish educational skills in practice." Therefore, preparedness is considered a motivator for achievement in this specific field.

Commercial Preparedness:

This concept emerged in contemporary literature in the early of 1990s, with the context of growing recognition of significant preparedness and innovation as strategic elements that distinguish successful organizations from competitors. Furthermore, it has been incorporated into a broader framework known as organizational preparedness, which refers to an organization's ability to anticipate future needs, ensure the security of vital supplies, and assess the preparedness of its human capital to meet future operational commercial requirements. Commercial preparedness also represents a fundamental pillar in supporting leadership continuity and enhancing the organizational resilience in the face of structural and institutional challenges.

Health Preparedness:

In the health sector, the concept of preparedness refers to the ability to plan ahead and respond effectively to health emergencies and disasters, whether resulting from epidemics, natural disasters, or humanitarian crises. This type of preparedness is particularly important during periods of escalating cross-border challenges. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a health disaster as a sudden phenomenon of sufficient magnitude to overwhelm the resources of a hospital, region, or location requiring an external support. This is the process of preparing for health disasters. Consequently, efforts must be made to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for any urgent emergencies.

Military Preparedness:

Military preparedness refers to the ability of army forces to carry out a range of military operations, including defeating enemies regardless of the threats they impose. Preparedness depends on the quality of military units' equipment, training, and leadership. Historically, states and empires have realized that survival did not depend alone on military strength itself, but also on the degree of preparedness proceeding any confrontation. This concept has evolved over time, becoming a crucial element in building a state's strength and preserving its national security and interests. Military preparedness includes the ability of planning for strategically defend to defend the national security of state, creating an effective plans to maintain national security, and developing means of gathering information through advanced technological methods, and ensure the combat capability of the armed forces to carry out the tasks under different circumstances, thereby confronting imminent threats.

Strategic Preparedness:

Specialists continually develop the concept of preparedness, evolving it from the idea of massive mobilization and military preparation to a modern concept encompassing the renewal of mechanisms and technologies, establishing robust industries, and updating the public structures of the state within the political construction framework, by establishing good industries, and renewing the public structures of the state within political construction structure.

Thus, "preparedness" is a civilizational term whose content is layered in meaning; it carries military connotations of mobilization, as well as transformative content involving comprehensive review at political, economic, intellectual, and military levels, ultimately organized into strategic frameworks to produce what is known as "strategic preparedness" and structured into a model organization or form of power. Preparedness has evolved over different historical periods, with the laws of force becoming increasingly active throughout these times. It represents the mobilization of the state's material and non-material resources to deal with potential threats and facilitate the achievement of objectives — that is, the state's management of uncertain and changing circumstances through measures of mobilization, preparedness, and planned action.

In short, preparedness is a key element of success across various fields. By taking proactive steps and investing in developing capabilities, skills, and awareness, the likelihood of achieving goals is increased, and the state of alertness and readiness to confront threats or challenges is enhanced. This includes taking proactive steps to ensure success in achieving the certain goal for the future. It has become a comprehensive concept that reflects integrated strategic preparedness. In 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense officially included the concept of "strategic preparedness" in its instructions for the first time, aiming to establish a systematic framework for assessing and improving initial military reaction preparedness according to the strategic objectives, by measuring and understanding strategic preparedness as essential respond for effectively overcoming future global challenges.

The resilience and preparedness of countries to confront major crises have become vital concerns for research institutions and policymakers. The goal is no longer merely to maintain balance; but to preserve it when confronting unexpected challenges. The ability to deal with urgent events depends on the social components and

its interactions, including shared values, available material and moral resources, institutions shaping decision-making, government legitimacy, and senior leadership acting according to these values. Therefore, preparedness to confront crises and threats enlarges beyond material resources to broader elements encompassing social dynamics, leadership, legitimacy, and institutions thus, preparedness has a strategic dimension capable of determining the scope of extended deterrence at any stage of strategic response.

Extended Deterrence and its Relationship with Strategic Preparedness:

Nuclear-weapon states do not hesitate to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, or even to consider actually using them, if they face a genuine existential threat to their survival or vital interests. This approach is based on the principle of nuclear deterrence, which aims to prevent any aggression through the threat of a nuclear response. Successive U.S. administrations have reinforced this principle in their foreign policy. Moreover, Russian president Vladimir Putin has emphasized that any conflict with Russia would compel it to choose strategic deterrence among available alternatives. However, this position becomes more complicated when applying extended deterrence, through which a nuclear state commits to protecting its allies and partners from external threats, including nuclear threats

The Process of Implementing Extended Deterrence:

Implementing extended deterrence requires extensive strategic preparedness, representing a strategic option and a strong competitive advantage for different countries. From political, military, economic, social, and psychological perspectives, it is insufficient merely to declare a commitment to nuclear deterrence. This commitment must be backed by operational capabilities, a firm political will, and a willingness to bear the consequences of providing a nuclear umbrella to others, including potential nuclear retaliation. The credibility of extended deterrence depends on the guarantor state's ability to convince both adversaries and allies that it is genuinely prepared to respond if one of its partners is threatened with a nuclear weapon. So that, from this challenge, a state might use nuclear weapons in self-defense without much hesitation, if it were placed in an existential defense position, or if it were at risk of a humiliating defeat. However, using nuclear weapons in defense of a third party requires careful balancing of credibility, potential consequences, and risks. Therefore, strategic preparedness is pivotal for the effectiveness of extended deterrence, as it gives allies and partners confidence while sending decisive deterrent messages to adversaries. Some nuclear states have long declared a theoretical commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella for their allies or partners. Yet, questions arise: If a nuclear attack actually occurs against an ally, would the guarantor state use its nuclear weapons against the attacker, bearing the enormous cost of retaliatory response? Is it strategically prepared at all levels — military, political, economic, media, psychological, and societal — for such a possibility? Would it accept the consequences to preserve interests and honor commitments to allies, or would it modify its nuclear deterrence strategy to avoid catastrophic outcomes? This central question underpins our research hypotheses and guides the analysis of related challenges.

The Extended Deterrence and Military Force Deployment:

Extended deterrence involves military deployment in allies and strategic partners territories, the development of joint missile defense systems, joint military exercises simulating potential nuclear scenarios, planning for nuclear emergencies, and close coordination among senior political and military leaders. For example, the United States commits to providing extended nuclear deterrence to NATO allies under Article 4 (Early Warning and Group Consultation) and Article 5 (collective defense). meaning the threat of using extended nuclear deterrence against any party that attacks any member of the alliance with nuclear weapons, whether Russia or others. This deterrence extends to South Korea and Japan against potential nuclear threats from North Korea or China, reinforced by the U.S. military presence in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. U.S. extended deterrence for South Korea, Japan, and partners is based on three components: organizing joint military exercises to enhance coordination and readiness, preparing regional forces to assume operational control in wartime, and demonstrating the U.S. nuclear commitment via nuclear-capable aircraft. Despite the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in the early 1990s, these measures maintain the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. This approach reflects the United States' determination to support allies, ensure regional stability, and deter potential aggressors such as North Korea or others. The U.S. policy of applying the option of extended deterrence to Japan, South Korea, and certain partners is primarily aimed at curbing the urge to pursue nuclear weapons. Therefore, it reflects how extended deterrence is not limited to protection against aggression alone; but also serves as a tool to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation? The Soviet Union (formerly) also applied the principle of extended deterrence to protect its allies within the Warsaw Pact from any nuclear attack that might come from the United States or any other nuclear power. Today, the Russian Federation continues in following up of this policy; but with less intensity, through its

strategic partnership with North Korea and some of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Extended deterrence also functions as a tool to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation. Historically, the Soviet Union applied extended deterrence to protect Warsaw Pact allies, and the Russian Federation continues this policy through strategic partnerships with North Korea and some former Soviet republics. For instance, the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with North Korea in 2024 stipulates military cooperation and joint defense against any aggression. Although, North Korea is a significant nuclear power. However, the Russian commitment indicates the role of the option of extended deterrence in the strategic doctrine of the major nuclear powers. Consequently, the relationship between strategic preparedness and extended deterrence is thus not merely technical or military but includes political, economic, and social dimensions. Nuclear states' interests intersect with responsibilities toward their allies and partners, creating both opportunities to enhance collective security and challenges from evolving strategic balances. Exploring these opportunities and challenges is essential for understanding the practical implementation of extended deterrence.

Opportunities for Implementing Extended Deterrence:

The relationship between deterrence and strategic preparedness is not limited to theoretical frameworks. In practice, it generates a range of opportunities that can directly impact the effectiveness of implementing extended deterrence. The most prominent opportunities are as following of:

The Quality and Development of Nuclear Weapons

The history and development of nuclear weapons demonstrate the persistence of nuclear deterrence as a mechanism for ensuring security and stability in the international order, despite ongoing challenges. Preventing major wars and regional conflict escalation remains central to deterrence, as illustrated by crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Some experts have called for replacing nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence due to technological advances.

The modernization of global nuclear arsenals reflects nuclear states' commitment to maintaining their capabilities. The United States, the Russian Federation, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea continually modernize their arsenals. For example, the Trump administration approved allocating (\$26) billion to modernize the American nuclear arsenal over two years, ensuring the United States remains at the forefront of global nuclear competition. Maintaining and enhancing nuclear power serves as a tool for strategic influence and pressure, reflecting power dynamics and the balance of deterrence. Obtaining and maintaining power is the ultimate objective of influenced states. Although, erupted amid global tensions, some actors are seeking to enhance their nuclear capabilities to achieve strategic superiority, which constitutes an instrument for pressuring others to develop their arsenals. Therefore, the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals remains a response to power dynamics and the balance of deterrence, with the necessity of understanding and managing these threats to maintain international peace and security as a real status quo.

The Unrealism of Nuclear Disarmament

The international order shows signs of escalating tensions among major powers, making nuclear disarmament an unattainable short-term goal. Nuclear-weapon states are reluctant to relinquish their arsenals, with tensions intensified in Europe following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Ukraine in 2022. In the Asia-Pacific, tensions between the United States and China are rising due to regional disputes, militarization of the South China Sea, and containment efforts. Russia has increased the risks associated with nuclear weapon use, especially after amending its nuclear creed in 2024 to allow nuclear weapon use even if exposed to potential conventional losses. The United States has reintroduced Cold War terminology in its defensive strategies, regarding China and Russia as powers reshaping the world order according to their interests. Consequently, diplomatic efforts are declining, nuclear negotiations with North Korea have stalled, and some regional states, such as Saudi Arabia and Japan, are enhancing their nuclear capabilities to strengthen defence credibility, increasing the risk of regional instability. Even in peacetime, states utilize military power for diplomatic leverage. Possessing nuclear or conventional capabilities allows states to exert pressure and maintain strategic advantage, illustrating the ongoing relevance of deterrence in both peace and war.

The Attacks from Neighboring Countries:

Persistent threats from neighboring states with superior nuclear or conventional capabilities compel some countries to rely on extended deterrence while developing their conventional deterrence. Taiwan, for instance, faces potential threats from China and invests in conventional deterrence to demonstrate preparedness to defend itself. This reinforces the logic of extended deterrence, providing a strategic partner, such as the United States, stronger justification for fulfilling commitments. U.S. extended deterrence applies partially to Taiwan, though it is not a formal nuclear umbrella. Agreements and cooperation declarations exist but do not legally oblige U.S. military

intervention if Taiwan is attacked. By contrast, the Baltic states are protected under NATO's Article 5, obliging the United States to respond in case of attack, potentially including nuclear measures. Russia's war on Ukraine has refocused deterrence discussions in Europe, with NATO identifying "deterrence and defense" as core missions. Therefore, The United States will decide according to the circumstances and political and military interests at that moment. It will face several difficulties, including securing the support of the American people for a war like this. U.S. extended deterrence applies partially to Taiwan, though it is not a formal nuclear umbrella. Agreements and cooperation declarations exist but do not legally oblige U.S. military intervention if Taiwan is attacked. By contrast, the Baltic states are protected under NATO's Article 5, obliging the United States to respond in case of attack, potentially including nuclear measures. Russia's war on Ukraine has refocused deterrence discussions in Europe, with NATO identifying "deterrence and defense" as core missions. Therefore, In the event of an attack on small countries such as the Baltic states, a direct response from the United States, perhaps even a nuclear response as part of extended deterrence, might be expected due to its legal contractual obligations.

Today, a new and more complex challenge is emerging, Will there still be a clear and binding rules in the nuclear future? Some actors, such as North Korea, are ignoring established international norms and agreements. This could lead to an increased likelihood of local or regional nuclear wars. So, the situation is exacerbated by several factors, including a lack of trust between the parties, weak communication channels, and small nuclear arsenals, as what happened in some regions such as India and Pakistan, or between South and North Korea. History shows that periods of crisis are often accompanied by misunderstandings of the adversaries' intentions, even when clear and specific messages are present. Considering situations where messages are absent, misdirected, poorly formulated, or contradictory, the likelihood of escalation increases might be as alternative in the regional politics.

Escalating Global Tensions

The tensions are no longer confined to the European continent; but have expanded globally. These transformations were expected to take place in the international arena following the end of the Cold War, as some traditional concepts that were a cornerstone of strategic thinking in the bipolar system declined. For example, what was considered a security necessity during the Soviet Union's existence became less urgent in the eyes of many decision-makers after its collapse. Among these transformations, a new vision emerged that downplayed the importance of extended deterrence. However, this vision proved inadequate. Europe is no longer in the center of tensions and wars; but it has extended to other regions, such as East Asia, becoming within a new position of tensions, driven by the increase in Chinese military capabilities and North Korea's missile and nuclear developments. U.S.A allies, particularly in Asia, have clearly expressed the importance of these commitments within the volatile security environment in the region. In addition to that, the transformations in the international order, including Russia and China's efforts to take a more effective role in it, and the resulting tensions became as a result of these efforts.

Maintaining International Prestige and Standing:

The most intellectual propositions indicate that there is a close relationship between power and status, as the power of the state is the cornerstone in determining its status and the dimensions of the role, it plays in the systems of the regional and international environments. Thus, credibility in extended deterrence represents not only a deterrent tool, but also a symbol reflecting a state's status and influence in the international order. For example, a deterrent state's strategic preparedness, such as developing its nuclear and conventional capabilities, reflects its efforts to maintain its position in competition with other major powers and reinforces the impression that it is capable of imposing its will and directing international issues in a manner that serves its interests. The major powers adopt extended deterrence, Major nuclear powers adopt extended deterrence to protect alliances, preserve international prestige, and defend national interests. Failure to provide nuclear guarantees to allies and partners means that they will fall under the influence of competing major powers, which represents a threat to the national interests and the reputation and status of the nuclear powers which adopt the option of extended deterrence. This applies to great and super powers such as Russia, which seeks to regain its global role. Therefore, Schelling believes that once war looms, the deterrent state often wants to avoid the consequences of its commitments by evading its deterrent threats. Anticipating this, some aggressors can convince themselves that the threats will be abandoned once the costs become too high, leading to deterrence failure, despite the presence of these rhetorical commitments. However, strengthening the aggressor's belief in the seriousness of these threats has become a major concern in deterrence studies. Schelling concluded that merely declaring a commitment is not enough. Rather, the defending deterrent state must demonstrate in practice that it has no choice; but to respond. Mechanisms for achieving such commitments emerge in the literature, including issuing explicit pledges, linking deterrence to the reputation of the national state, which is at stake, concluding formal mutual defense agreements, deploying forces in different strategic locations, and building logistical infrastructures that reflect a willingness to reinforce them in

times of conflict. However, adopting these irrevocable commitments oblige the state to bear significant political burdens greater than what the defender might be willing to bear in peacetime.

Challenges of Implementing Extended Deterrence

The challenges of implementing extended deterrence divided into different items as following as threatens and using nuclear weapons to be as a tool of an extended deterrence.

The Scarcity of Nuclear Weapons in the Face of Conventional and Advanced Military Threats:

The global order is undergoing transformations due to rapid technological developments. The development of new technologies has fundamentally impacted on traditional concepts of nuclear deterrence. These technologies have not only changed the nature of threats that must be confronted within the framework of deterrence; but have also reshaped the supply chains which related to weapons systems and available capabilities. Moreover, this technology has contributed to the creation of a "grey" zone that separating nuclear weapons from conventional weapons systems, and which has increased the complexity of the deterrence equation. The limitations of nuclear deterrence in the face of conventional military threats are among the factors that have contributed to the continuation and development of the modern pattern of warfare. These wars, such as hybrid or asymmetric warfare such as cyber operations, are often designed to avoid any immediate reaction from the opponent, meaning it is difficult to respond directly or quickly, especially a response that based on nuclear deterrence, which traditionally constitutes a deterrent barrier in front of any direct threat guided to the interests of a nuclear state. However, the nature of modern warfare, including its unconventional means and tactics, has weakened the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. In addition to that, non-military threats such as cyber threats that are difficult to deter nuclear power and are considered security threats. However, civil wars and ethnic conflicts are increasing in frequency with the emergence of a growing role of non-state actors within armed conflicts. This gap created space for adopting a new deterrence approach that is consistent with the changes that happened in the contemporary strategic environment; but this does not mean that traditional threats are absent; but as traditional power remains to perform an important role. Thus, U.S. political and military assessments indicate that conventional military threats, such as a Russian attack on NATO's eastern front, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or a large-scale bombing or occupation by North Korea against one of its neighbors, although they do not appear imminent at the present time; but they are worrisome of disputes consequently. Moreover, the fundamental problem for policymakers is that the outbreak of expected conflicts in these regions, especially with the participation of the United States, will have disastrous consequences. Even in the event of victory, the results of such wars may be costly and undesirable. Nevertheless, it has become necessary to reconsider extended deterrence and explore new mechanisms that take into account the changes might obtain for any reason. The essence of strategy lies in balancing among priorities by coordinating goals and means. It is not limited to military strategy alone; but rather utilizes all the tools available to the state. Therefore, policymakers must employ all forms of power in long-term planning to achieve their desired interests.

The Difficult of Using Nuclear Weapons

The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons places the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence in a difficult position. This problem has explained by Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, who, despite his constant reiteration of the promise of extended deterrence towards NATO allies, his realistic analysis holds that "the European allies should not continue to demand what we double our strategic guarantees; because if we do, we risk the destruction of civilization." This confirms vision that extended nuclear deterrence would face fundamental challenges in maintaining its role as an effective security mechanism in the international order. One of the catastrophic effects of using nuclear weapons is their impact on the environment, as they extend beyond the territorial borders of the state itself. So that, it has become a matter of concern for international law, such as environmental problems have gained international attention; because they have an impact on the international community and have also effects on the economic and social development. This interest is evident through the establishment of several forums and the conclusion of agreements to protect the international environment; despite groups have also emerged calling for a permission to stop nuclear testing, and a ban on its use in the wars; because of its negative effects for the future. Nuclear weapon use has severe environmental impacts, extending beyond state borders, raising concerns in international law and global governance. International agreements and forums have sought to limit nuclear testing and use due to these risks. The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 exemplifies the catastrophic consequences of radioactive materials on humans and the environment.

Priority of Defending the State Itself:

The defense of the state's integrity and its territorial integrity is the primary objective of most national defense strategies around the world, whether in the face of direct military threats or non-military threats such as terrorism or internal crises, as countries arm themselves exploiting to consolidate their sovereignty over their territory and

national unity. The paths of alliances are only for the sake of achieving survival and realizing the importance of national interest in a chaotic international order. According to that, the armament means completing the state's ability to confront any aggression and ensuring continuous protection of lands, populations, and wealth. Then, preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty is the main objective of an effective national defense strategy, such as the Russian strategy, in which preserving the country's territory and keeping it intact is a priority. Ultimately, the primary goal of state strategies is to preserve the territorial integrity of its own territory, not the territory of its allies and partners; but only when this aligns with its interests and objectives vulnerable to a real danger.

The Capabilities and Credibility

The central powers in the international order impose their influence based on its capabilities. Capabilities are an essential part of extended deterrence and assurances. They primarily mission depend on possessing advanced military capabilities (nuclear and conventional) with effective means of delivery, to ensure credible deterrence in front of different threats. However, capabilities alone are not sufficient. They must be supported by a clear political commitment and credibility in actual use. This requires strong signals such as force deployments and joint exercises, as well as the need for continuous coordination and in-depth consultations with allies on threats and challenges alike, to ensure that policy design is not imposed as a status quo situation; but rather stems from a mutual understanding of each ally's specific circumstances surrounding it. This collaborative approach enhances trust and prevents the strategic loss of alliances. Then, given the desire of allied countries to maintain their independence and not become a mere proxy or a part of an arena of conflict.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Based on the detailed analysis above, it becomes clear that the effectiveness of extended deterrence is not determined solely by possession of nuclear capabilities but also by the availability of strategic preparedness components — political, economic, military, and social — within guarantor states. Nuclear armament, coupled with diverse threats in the international order, reinforces the necessity of extended deterrence as a vital tool not only for ensuring the security of allies but also for preserving the prestige and status of major powers.

Thus, the implementation of extended deterrence opens up opportunities for nuclear powers to do much powerful impact. On the contrary of that, the implementation of extended deterrence will also confront real new challenges. Therefore, the future of extended deterrence will remain dependent on the ability of great nuclear powers to overcome these challenges and capitalize the opportunities by enhancing their credibility in adopting extended deterrence, enabling them to maintain the security of their allies without slipping into a catastrophic confrontation. This requires strategic preparedness on the part of the state defending allies, which increases its credibility in achieving extended deterrence. In other words, the effectiveness of extended deterrence cannot be achieved in isolation from the level of strategic preparedness that possessed by different states. Therefore, the higher the level of strategic preparedness, with its various military, political, economic, etc. dimensions, will have the greater capacity of a nuclear state to adopt extended deterrence as an effective option in its defensive policy.

Conclusions

The research concluded the following conclusions:

- Extended deterrence is one of the most important and dangerous principles of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary history, when it based on the importance and serious consequences of some nuclear powers' commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella for other states and bearing the consequences of this commitment.
- The most dangerous aspect of extended deterrence is the practical option it entails, once a guarantor state uses its nuclear weapons, it may be exposed to retaliatory nuclear attacks by another nuclear state, leading to enormous human and material costs.
- Extended deterrence is often criticized by strategic thinkers as a hypothetical and unrealistic principle. Their criticism stems from the fact that the nuclear powers' declaration of their adherence to this principle in theory is one thing, while their ability to implement it in practice.
- Despite motivations such as maintaining international standing, consolidating alliances, and protecting interests from rival nuclear powers, the simultaneous employment of extended deterrence confronts numerous challenges. For states lacking a high level of strategic preparedness, implementation may be nearly impossible and may create uncertainty regarding mutual commitments.
- Despite doubts and challenges due to its high costs, extended deterrence remains largely dependent on the strategic preparedness of the states employing it and their capacity to bear the consequences of implementing its objectives on the ground.

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