

Recalibrating Judicial Oversight in Indonesia: The Binding Force of the Judicial Commission's Recommendations

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the institutional challenges and reform imperatives of Indonesia's Judicial Commission in enforcing judicial ethics and accountability within the framework of judicial independence. Despite its constitutional mandate under Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution, the Commission's recommendations to the Supreme Court remain non-binding, resulting in weak enforcement and persistent institutional tension between oversight and independence. Through a comparative analysis of judicial councils in France and Italy, the paper highlights how binding disciplinary authority may strengthen judicial legitimacy without compromising autonomy. The study argues for amending Law on Judicial Commission to grant binding legal force to the Commission disciplinary decisions, supported by administrative implementation by the Supreme Court. Such reform would institutionalize ethical accountability, enhance public trust, and align Indonesia's judicial governance with established international best practices.

Keywords: Judicial Commission, Judicial Accountability; Judicial Independence; Judicial Reform.

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of an independent judiciary is central to the modern rule-of-law state, ensuring both legal certainty and public confidence (Cappelletti, 1989). Indonesia, as a state founded upon the rule of law, Indonesia must fulfill several fundamental prerequisites within its constitutional system—most importantly, the establishment of an independent judiciary that is free from external influence, neutral, and capable of upholding the rule of law. The existence of judicial power is a constitutional mandate set forth in Article 24 (1) of the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, which declares that:

“Judicial power shall be independent and shall have the authority to administer justice to uphold law and justice Indonesia.” (Republic of Indonesia, 1975 Article 24(1)).

Judicial independence must coexist with accountability to preserve legitimacy within democratic systems (Ginsburg, 2018, pp. 57–59). Among the organs vested with judicial authority under the Constitution is the Judicial Commission. Article 24B (1) of the 1945 Constitution states: “The Judicial Commission shall be independent and shall have the authority to propose the appointment of justices of the Supreme Court and to exercise other powers in order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges.” (Republic of Indonesia, 1975 Article 24B (1))

The Judicial Commission, therefore, serves as an independent state institution endowed with the authority and responsibility to conduct external oversight over the judiciary. Its primary duty is to uphold and enforce ethical standards among judges, thereby maintaining the honor and dignity of the judicial system while ensuring judicial independence, particularly in decision-making processes (Annual Report, 2024).

The Commission's powers are further defined in Law No. 18 of 2011 on Amendments to Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission. This law, as mandated by Article 24B (4) of the Constitution, regulates the structure, status, and membership of the Judicial Commission (Republic of Indonesia, 2011). Article 13 of the law stipulates that the Judicial Commission shall have the authority to:

1. propose the appointment of Supreme Court justices and ad hoc judges in the Supreme Court to the House of Representatives for approval;
2. maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges;
3. jointly establish a Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judicial Conduct with the Supreme Court; and
4. ensure the enforcement of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judicial Conduct (Republic of Indonesia, 2011 Article 13).

Under this framework, the Judicial Commission functions not as an enforcer of legal norms (code of law), but as an enforcer of ethical norms (code of ethics). Its role is that of an external auditor, tasked with supervising judges of the Supreme Court and the courts under its jurisdiction—though not judges of the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2006). The Commission's oversight ensures that judges perform their duties independently, free from interference or influence, and with full integrity.

Article 40 of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power reinforces this authority by providing that:

1. In order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges, external supervision shall be conducted by the Judicial Commission.
2. In exercising such supervision, the Judicial Commission shall oversee judges' conduct in accordance with the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct (Republic of Indonesia, 2009 Article 40).

However, In practice, oversight by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission has often produced differing interpretations of the boundary between judicial technicality and judicial behavior (Butt & Lindsey, 2012). The Supreme Court views supervision as an internal function limited to reviewing judicial performance through appellate processes such as appeal and cassation. In contrast, the Judicial Commission grounds its authority in the ethical principles of the Code of Judicial Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, asserting its competence to monitor judges' professionalism and integrity without interfering in judicial reasoning (Rifqi, 2018).

This divergence has led to persistent institutional tension between the two bodies, resulting in numerous Judicial Commission recommendations being unimplemented by the Supreme Court (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2022a, pp. 27–30). For example, in 2021, the Judicial Commission submitted 60 disciplinary recommendations against judges found to have violated the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct (KEPPH). However, the Supreme Court acted upon only three (3) of these recommendations (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2021, pp. 13–14). The Court reasoned that most of the Commission's findings concerned matters of judicial technicality, which it considered outside the Commission's jurisdiction (Supreme Court Republic of Indonesia, 2022, pp. 55–57).

Such a lack of enforcement illustrates the absence of binding authority in the Judicial Commission's recommendations, creating a vacuum that undermines the effectiveness of judicial oversight and fosters legal uncertainty within Indonesia's judicial system (Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK), 2021, pp. 41–43). Therefore, it is imperative to establish a clearer legal framework delineating the boundaries of authority between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission and to reinforce the binding nature of the Commission's recommendations to ensure a more effective and accountable system of judicial ethics enforcement (European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), 2019).

DISCUSSION

The Legal Standing of the Judicial Commission's Recommendations Toward the Supreme Court

The Judicial Commission is one of the "state institutions explicitly mentioned in the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia" (Republic of Indonesia, 1975 Article 24B(1)). The Commission functions as a national body headquartered in the capital city. Historically, the establishment of the Judicial Commission generated significant constitutional debate, particularly concerning its inclusion within the framework of the 1945 Constitution (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2022a, pp. 5–6).

However, the Constitutional Court, in its Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006 dated 23 August 2006, clarified that:

"The inclusion or exclusion of a state institution within the Constitution shall not be interpreted as the sole determinant of its constitutional status. For example, the regulation of the National Police and its constitutional authority in Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution, compared with the absence of provisions regarding the Office of the Attorney General, does not imply that the Constitution deems the Police to be of higher constitutional standing than the Attorney General's Office. Likewise, national commissions such as the Judicial Commission (KY), the

General Elections Commission (KPU), the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), or the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU)—whether regulated explicitly or established by statute—derive their legal and institutional legitimacy from the laws enacted by the legislature. Therefore, to avoid institutional ambiguity or conflict among state organs, the legislature must clearly and precisely define the legal policies governing such institutions.” (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2006, pp. 45–47).

Based on this reasoning, the constitutional inclusion of the Judicial Commission within the 1945 Constitution is not problematic. Although the Judicial Commission does not exercise judicial power in the sense of adjudicating or deciding cases, its inclusion in the Chapter on Judicial Power of the Indonesian Constitution—alongside the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court—signifies its integral role within the constitutional architecture of judicial governance (Republic of Indonesia, 1975 Chapter IX, Article 24). This placement reflects the constitutional formulators’ intent to institutionalize external oversight as an essential component of judicial power itself, ensuring that independence is balanced with accountability (Butt & Lindsey, 2012).

The idea of a judicial supervisory body in Indonesia predates the establishment of the Judicial Commission. Since 1968, there had been proposals to form the Judicial Research and Advisory Council and the Judicial Honorary Council. These bodies were intended to provide advice and make final determinations on judicial matters submitted by the Supreme Court or the Minister of Justice, such as promotions, transfers, and dismissals of judges (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2013, p. 13).

Unfortunately, these proposals were never incorporated into Law No. 14 of 1970 on the Basic Provisions of Judicial Power, and the concept of external judicial oversight only materialized decades later—following the constitutional amendments enacted in the early 2000s during Indonesia’s reform era, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Judicial Commission. These amendments marked a significant shift toward democratization and judicial reform, recognizing the necessity of an independent oversight body to restore integrity and public trust in the judiciary.

The establishment of the Judicial Commission is not an unprecedented phenomenon in constitutional governance. Around the world, various systems of judicial oversight have long existed to safeguard judicial independence and integrity (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2020). The creation of judicial oversight bodies gained renewed prominence after the end of the Cold War, as many countries sought to rebuild public confidence in judicial institutions through transparent and accountable governance (Vodet, 2013).

In many European countries adhering to the civil law tradition—similar to Indonesia—the creation of Judicial Councils became a hallmark of judicial reform (European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), 2019, pp. 8–10). The European Union, for instance, requires candidate states in Eastern Europe seeking accession to the EU to establish independent judicial councils as a precondition for membership, emphasizing their centrality in safeguarding judicial independence and integrity (European Commission, 2002).

The Judicial Council of France (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, CSM) is constitutionally established under the 1958 Constitution, to guarantee that judicial careers would not be dominated or politically manipulated by the executive branch (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (France), 1958). Beyond ensuring independence, the CSM institutionalized a collegial and procedural mechanism for handling judicial discipline and ethics, replacing the former system of administrative discretion exercised by the Minister of Justice (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (France), 2024).

Similarly, in Italy, the establishment and subsequent transformation of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (CSM) were motivated by historical experiences under fascist rule, designed to ensure that the judiciary would never again serve as a political instrument (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (Italy), 2006). Both models evolved into constitutional organs responsible for judicial appointments, promotions, and disciplinary supervision, embodying the principle that independence and accountability must coexist within the judiciary.

In Indonesia, the formation of the Judicial Commission was primarily motivated by the low level of public trust in its judiciary (Butt, 2013; Pompe, 2005, pp. 307–310). This judicial crisis necessitated the establishment of an external oversight mechanism, which materialized through the judicial reform movement and was constitutionally enshrined in the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution in 2001. Article 24B (1) formally established the Judicial Commission, granting it two fundamental constitutional powers: *first*, the authority to propose the appointment of Supreme Court justices; and *second*, the authority to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and integrity of judges.

The operational foundation for the Judicial Commission was subsequently codified in Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission, enacted on 13 August 2004 in Jakarta. This law was later amended by Law No. 18 of 2011, which strengthened the Commission’s authority, including the power to conduct selection processes for the appointment of ad hoc judges in the Supreme Court, among other expanded powers. The Judicial Commission Law clearly defines the Commission’s duties and powers as follows (Republic of Indonesia, 2011 Article 13):

“The Judicial Commission shall have the authority to:

1. propose the appointment of Supreme Court justices and ad hoc judges in the Supreme Court to the House of Representatives for approval;
2. safeguard and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges;
3. jointly establish the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judicial Conduct with the Supreme Court; and
4. supervise the enforcement of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judicial Conduct.”

Furthermore, Article 20 specifies the Commission’s supervisory duties (Republic of Indonesia, 2011 Article 13):

1. “In order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges, the Judicial Commission shall: 1. The authority to propose the appointment of Supreme Court justices; and
2. The authority to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and integrity of judges
 - a. monitor and supervise the conduct of judges;
 - b. receive public complaints concerning violations of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judicial Conduct;
 - c. conduct verification, clarification, and investigation of alleged violations confidentially;
 - d. determine the validity of such allegations; and
 - e. take legal or other measures against individuals or entities that undermine the honor and dignity of judges.
1. In addition, the Commission shall strive to enhance judges’ capacity and welfare.
2. The Commission may request assistance from law enforcement agencies to conduct wiretapping or record conversations in cases involving suspected violations of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judicial Conduct.
3. Law enforcement agencies are obliged to comply with such requests.”

In exercising its authority -particularly in enforcing judicial ethics- Article 22D(1) of the Judicial Commission Law grants the Commission the power to address judicial misconduct through recommendations for disciplinary sanctions to be executed by the Supreme Court. As the execution of sanctions falls under the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, the Commission’s role is recommendatory rather than executory. The Supreme Court may either accept or reject the Judicial Commission’s recommendations. If accepted, the Supreme Court must implement them within 60 days, as mentioned in Article 22E (1):

1. “If there is no disagreement between the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court and the Court has not yet imposed the sanction within the specified time limit, the Commission’s recommendation shall automatically take effect and must be enforced by the Supreme Court.”

If rejected, Article 22E (2) of the same law provides that:

2. “In cases of disagreement between the two institutions concerning the imposition of disciplinary sanctions (mild, moderate, or severe), a joint review shall be conducted.
3. If consensus is not reached within the specified time frame, the Judicial Commission’s recommendation, provided it meets the statutory requirements, shall automatically take effect and must be implemented by the Supreme Court.”

These provisions indicate that the Judicial Commission’s recommendations possess a clear legal basis and must be duly considered by the Supreme Court. Under certain conditions, the recommendations even acquire automatic binding force. However, in practice there is a lack of responsiveness not only undermines the legal force of the Judicial Commission’s recommendations but also weakens the integrity of the judicial oversight mechanism envisioned under Indonesia’s constitutional framework.

The Problems in Implementing the Binding Force of the Judicial Commission’s Recommendations

The weak response of the Supreme Court toward the Judicial Commission’s recommendations is evident from the minimal number of follow-ups carried out in recent years (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2021a, pp. 12–15). In 2020, the Judicial Commission received a total of 2,337 reports, 1,367 public complaints. Of these, 128 public reports were formally registered. Disciplinary sanctions were imposed on 124 judges, including 81 minor sanctions, 36 moderate sanctions, and 7 severe sanctions (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2021a, pp. 12–15). The high volume of complaints received stands in sharp contrast to the limited implementation of sanctions, reflecting the lack of responsiveness from the Supreme Court (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2022a, pp. 27–28).

In 2021, the Judicial Commission received 1,481 public complaints (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2022b, pp. 20–22). Of the 218 cases reviewed that year, 187 were found unsubstantiated, and 57 were confirmed as violations. These 57 verified cases involved 97 judges recommended for disciplinary sanctions of varying degrees. However, from all the recommendations submitted to the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung,

MA) in 2021, only two were acted upon. Meanwhile, 3 recommendations were rejected by the Supreme Court on the grounds of “judicial technicality,” 17 others received no response. The absence of adequate follow-up from the Supreme Court regarding the Judicial Commission’s recommendations continues to be a persistent issue even up to 2025.

This situation arises from the lack of explicit binding authority attached to the Commission’s recommendations, which leaves them dependent on the Supreme Court’s discretion. The limited follow-up also stems from a legal vacuum concerning the boundary between the domains of judicial technicality and judicial conduct (Rifqi, 2019). According to the Supreme Court, judges possess independence in handling cases, and any errors in judgment must be corrected through legal remedies such as appeal or cassation. In contrast, the Judicial Commission maintains that it has the authority to supervise judges based on ten (10) ethical principles enshrined in the Code of Judicial Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct that jointly established by the Supreme Court and Judicial Commission in 2009 (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2009). The Commission asserts that its oversight focuses on ethical professionalism, not on judicial reasoning or verdicts, which remain protected under the principle of judicial independence (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2021b, pp. 11–12). Errors in legal reasoning, therefore, must be addressed through judicial remedies, whereas the breaches of (ten) 10 principles of ethics, including on professional conduct, are within the Judicial Commission’s legitimate jurisdiction to investigate (Wajdi, Imran, & Hasanuddin, 2020, p. 98).

This ambiguity hampers effective oversight and results in an inefficient supervision mechanism within the judiciary.⁴² The resistance from the Supreme Court, which often refuses to implement the Judicial Commission’s recommendations, has further entrenched this institutional weakness. As a result, the Judicial Commission has effectively been reduced to a body that merely receives and reviews public complaints, without the power to impose sanctions or execute disciplinary actions against judges found in violation of the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct.

In practice, this has created a paradox: while the Judicial Commission was established to uphold the integrity and honor of the judiciary, it lacks the authority to directly impose or enforce sanctions against judges. This situation stands in stark contrast to the Commission’s founding spirit—to act as an intensive and independent oversight body for the judiciary. Despite its statutory and moral legitimacy, as reflected in the high level of public trust and the numerous reports submitted by citizens, the Commission’s limited power to enforce its findings severely hampers its effectiveness.

The absence of binding power over the Judicial Commission’s recommendations to the Supreme Court prevents the fulfillment of the Commission’s ultimate objectives—to conduct meaningful oversight of judges and to promote an independent and integrity-based judicial system in Indonesia. Unless the legal framework explicitly grants binding authority to the Commission’s recommendations, judicial oversight will remain ineffective, and the broader goal of judicial reform—ensuring accountability, transparency, and integrity—will continue to face structural obstacles.

The Urgency of Reforming and Strengthening the Judicial Commission’s Authority through the Revision of Law concerning the Judicial Commission

Over the years, Judicial Commission has made continuous efforts to preserve and strengthen judicial integrity, seeking to ensure that the judiciary remains free from undue influence and external pressure. As part of this commitment, the Commission has become one of the pivotal institutions in Indonesia’s effort to eradicate judicial misconduct and restore public trust in the rule of law. This public trust is evident from the consistently high number of complaints received by the Commission each year, reflecting citizens’ belief in Judicial Commission as a moral and institutional safeguard of judicial integrity (Judicial Commission Republic Indonesia, 2023, pp. 8–10). However, since its operationalization in 2005, the Commission’s performance has not fully reflected the magnitude of its constitutional and institutional mandate. Despite its noble mission, Commission’s authority and enforcement power remain constrained, as it lacks the capacity to independently execute disciplinary sanctions.

The long trajectory of the Commission’s development reveals a pattern of institutional challenges and structural limitations. Since its establishment, Commission powers have been narrowly defined. Under Law No. 22 of 2004, the Commission was authorized only to summon and examine judges and to make recommendations to the Supreme Court, without any enforcement authority. The non-binding nature of these recommendations continues to undermine the Commission’s effectiveness, as lack of execution for sanction recommendations concerning judges found to have violated ethical standards. This persistent lack of follow-up has rendered Commission enforcement efforts symbolic rather than substantive, preventing it from functioning as an effective guardian of judicial integrity. These structural weaknesses have significantly hindered the Commission’s ability to perform its role as the custodian of judicial honor and dignity. Therefore, there is an urgent need for institutional reform to establish a more robust and enforceable framework for ethical accountability (European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), 2019, pp. 11–13). Such reform must be achieved through a revision of Law No.

18 of 2011, which amended the earlier Law No. 22 of 2004 on the Judicial Commission, thereby strengthening Commission's authority to ensure that judicial ethics enforcement becomes effective, independent, and binding (Republic of Indonesia, 2025). The reform process should address several key areas of enhancement, foremost among them normative reform—that is, strengthening the legal basis and binding nature of the Judicial Commission's recommendations on sanction.

Many European systems, such as France and Italy, empower judicial councils with binding disciplinary authority (Bell, 2006, pp. 112–115). Hence, a crucial reform required to enhance the effectiveness of judicial accountability in Indonesia is the strengthening of the binding force of Commission decisions regarding ethical sanctions on judges. Under the current framework, Commission determinations are limited to non-binding recommendations, while the Supreme Court retains discretionary authority to accept or reject them. This institutional arrangement has often weakened the deterrent effect of disciplinary enforcement and undermined public confidence in the judiciary's capacity for self-correction.

To ensure effective accountability, Judicial Commission decisions on judicial sanctions should be granted binding legal force, while the Supreme Court's role should be limited to administrative implementation. Once Judicial Commission concludes an ethical proceeding and determines that a violation has occurred, its decision should be final and enforceable within the domain of judicial ethics. The Supreme Court would then be required to issue the corresponding administrative decree—such as demotion, transfer, or suspension—within a prescribed timeframe (Judicial Commission Republic of Indonesia, 2022a, pp. 52–53).

This model clarifies institutional roles: Judicial Commission acts as an ethical adjudicator, whereas the Supreme Court functions as an administrative executor. The arrangement mirrors the system in France, where the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM)'s disciplinary decisions are final and binding, implemented directly by the Ministry of Justice without substantive review (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (France), 1958). Likewise, in Italy, the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (CSM) has exclusive authority to decide disciplinary cases, while the executive authority merely formalizes those decisions administratively (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (Italy), 2006 Art 15).

Such a mechanism would prevent the recurring problem of ignored or delayed recommendations and would enhance legal certainty and institutional accountability (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2020, pp. 40–42). Moreover, this reform would reinforce the checks-and-balances principle between the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court, ensuring a more transparent and participatory system of judicial supervision.

A suggested legislative formulation of this principle may read as follows:

“Decisions of the Judicial Commission concerning ethical violations by judges shall have binding legal effect.

The Supreme Court shall be obliged to implement such decisions administratively within a stipulated period.” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2020, pp. 40–42).

Such a clause, if included in the amendment to Law No. 18 of 2011, would preserve judicial independence while ensuring enforceable ethical accountability—a structure already proven effective in several European judicial councils (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (France), 2024; Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, 2024).

Granting binding force to the Judicial Commission's disciplinary decisions does not threaten judicial independence (Ginsburg, 2018, pp. 56–60). In constitutional jurisprudence, judicial independence refers primarily to adjudicative autonomy—freedom from interference in deciding cases—not immunity from ethical oversight (European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), 2021, pp. 15–17). Ethical and administrative accountability mechanisms, when clearly defined, complement rather than contradict independence, by safeguarding the judiciary's moral authority and institutional legitimacy (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2020, pp. 38–40).

By allocating binding authority to KY and restricting the Supreme Court's (Mahkamah Agung, MA) role to administrative enforcement, Indonesia would achieve a functional separation within the judiciary itself: KY adjudicates ethical responsibility, while MA ensures administrative compliance. This delineation prevents conflicts of interest and institutional deadlock, while promoting checks and balances within the judicial branch as well as institutionalizes ethical accountability as an inherent dimension of judicial professionalism, ensuring that independence does not devolve into impunity (Ginsburg, 2018, pp. 61–63).

CONCLUSION

The Judicial Commission holds a pivotal role within Indonesia's judicial system as a key institution tasked with realizing a judiciary that is clean, independent, and accountable. Its establishment represents one of the central pillars of post-reform efforts to restore public trust in Indonesia's judicial institutions, following years of declining confidence in judicial integrity and performance. The Commission is explicitly regulated in Article 24B of the 1945

Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and its operations are further governed by Law No. 18 of 2011 on Amendments to Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission. Among its main mandates is the exercise of external oversight over judges, including the receipt and follow-up of public reports regarding alleged ethical violations committed by judges in the judicial process. However, despite its crucial role, the Commission's practical authority remains severely limited. The recommendations it submits to the Supreme Court lack binding force, leaving their enforcement dependent upon the Court's discretion. Consequently, while the Commission may identify and report ethical violations, it possesses no direct authority to impose or execute sanctions. As a result, the original objectives behind the establishment of the Judicial Commission—namely, to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of judges—have been only partially achieved. To address this institutional weakness, it is imperative to undertake a comprehensive reform of the Judicial Commission's legal framework through a revision of the Judicial Commission Law. Judicial accountability, when properly institutionalized, enhances rather than constrains independence the judiciary (Garoupa & Ginsburg, 2015, pp. 76–78).

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