Neoliberal Intergovernmentality in Peru: Centralized Power and Territorial Inequality in Local Arenas

Abstract

The persistence of centralized state structures in Peru has shaped a landscape of profound territorial inequalities, where planning dynamics, budget execution, and intergovernmental coordination remain subordinated to the power of the national Executive. Within this context, the study explores the tensions between centralism, neoliberal intergovernmentality and local socioeconomic development, drawing on a qualitative inquiry that captures the experiences of local governments in peripheral Andean territories. The analysis reveals that excessive bureaucratization, clientelist dependency, institutional capture of resources, and the inefficiency of decentralized agencies perpetuate the subordination of municipalities and reinforce their exclusion. Nonetheless, proactive community-driven dynamics also emerge, which, grounded in social capacities and a strong sense of belonging, articulate development processes that offer alternatives to the model imposed from the center. The study critically interrogates the prevailing decentralist rhetoric and warns that, without fiscal justice, operational autonomy, and the recognition of territorial capacities, territorial inequality will continue to deepen. Therefore, a structural transformation in the architecture of the Peruvian state is imperative to overcome the centralist model and move toward a situated, democratic, and multilevel territorial governance.