Inclusive Development after Reformasi: The Role of Chinese Indonesians in North Sumatra

Abstract

This study explains how Chinese-Indonesian elites in North Sumatra convert long-run economic centrality into formal political incorporation, and under what electoral conditions these advantages yield vote gains. Using an explanatory-sequential mixed-methods design, we combine administrative and electoral records, association and business registries, media/archival sources, and 25–35 semi-structured interviews. Quantitatively, Model A (logit) estimates the probability of incorporation as a function of economic centrality and capital depth; Model B (OLS/fractional logit) evaluates the effect of recruitment signals on vote share and their interaction with cleavage softness; Model C tests whether associational density mediates the effect of economic centrality on incorporation. Results show that economic centrality significantly increases incorporation (β₁>0), that recruitment advantages translate more strongly into votes in mixed/urban areas (θ₃>0), and that associational density provides a small-to-moderate but significant mediating channel (indirect effect; complementary partial mediation). Findings are robust to alternative operationalizations, matching, and instrumental-variable strategies, and placebo tests suggest group-specific mechanisms rather than sectoral artifacts. Theoretically, the evidence integrates Push–Pull legacies (spatial–sectoral selection), Diaspora-based social capital (organizational density and bridging), and Middleman Minority incentives (resource-based institutional embedding). Practically, parties and local governments can enhance pluralistic representation by recruiting community-embedded candidates and investing in multiethnic civic programs that convert private resources into public goods. The framework is portable to other plural democracies featuring commercially central minorities.